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This analysis examines India’s ongoing counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Kashmir 
and the Nepalese campaign against the Maoists from 1996 to 2006. Both COIN efforts 
have encountered extensive ethnic mobilization and problematic border relations and 
have experienced failures and successes of varying degrees at different times. To find a 
better COIN approach in complex environments, this thesis applies the basic framework 
of an integrated set of political, socio-economic, and security elements of COIN 
strategies. While the enemy-centric COIN approach was only able to contain the 
insurgency during the 1990s, recent success in Kashmir after 2000 has been achieved 
through a mixed approach that integrates all available national means, such as political, 
economic, and information programs, with its military efforts. For its part, the Nepalese 
COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006 overemphasized the enemy-centric approach and 
failed to defeat the insurgency because it did not integrate all available national resources. 
This thesis finds that the mixed approach must be balanced and blended with other 
important factors, such as information operations, diplomatic measures, and international 
aspects, because no developing countries operate in isolation. They are deeply influenced 
by their global strategic position, external players, and the strategic interests of their 
neighbors. Thus, the insights gained here are intended to support further analysis of the 
larger scope of the COIN campaign in India and Nepal to find an approach that is even 
more effective. 
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I. THESIS PROPOSAL 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The theoretical literature on counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns is a fairly new 
field reflecting scholarly insights into the various insurgencies and experiences of 
governments and populations. The field, however, lacks an understanding of the more 
complex cases due to the simplistic division between the population-centric approach 
based on winning hearts and minds (WHAM) and the enemy-centric approach based on 
aggressive security operations. Recognizing this, some scholars, such as David Kilcullen, 
have suggested that neither the population-centric nor the enemy-centric approach alone 
can fully explain COIN success or failure.1 For instance, an analysis of the insurgencies 
in developing countries that have experienced extensive ethnic mobilizations and 
problematic border relations presents examples of the limited nature of such approaches. 
This thesis seeks to examine the problematic nature of a divided COIN strategy 
and the problems it presents. While scholars or policy makers often show a preference for 
one strategy over the other, over time both strategies have been shown to be problematic. 
The question addressed in this thesis is whether the division of the field of COIN into 
enemy-centric and population-centric approaches undermines COIN efforts in developing 
countries. This thesis explores the application aspects of the two approaches by 
examining the state’s COIN efforts and their results in insurgencies in Kashmir and 
Nepal. 
The COIN efforts against the Kashmir insurgency in India and the Maoist 
insurgency in Nepal have both experienced failure and success at various junctures. The 
two regions also present international border complexities, which need to be taken into 
account in COIN efforts. In 1989, Kashmir, a state in northern India that had faced 
consolidation challenges since 1947, confronted an unusual form of unrest when 
Kashmiri Muslims started an armed struggle for independence from India. Prior to this, 
1 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1–2. 
 1 
                                                 
consolidation efforts failed, primarily at the governmental level. The internal security 
situation reached a new urgency when the daughter of India’s Home Minister was 
abducted on December 8, 1989, followed by a violent confrontation.2 India mobilized its 
army to fight the insurgency and began to rely on the armed forces to control the security 
setting for the following decades. After 1998, the Indian COIN strategy shifted from an 
aggressive military response to a mixed approach that included continuing massive 
military deployment—Operation Parakram3—along with people-oriented programs such 
as socio-economic development and political dialogue—Operation Sadbhavana.4 While 
the campaign is still ongoing, this thesis will examine the success or failures of the mixed 
approach, which some have argued has led to increased levels of COIN success. 
In the same decade, Nepal also experienced an insurgency, a violent Maoist 
movement that began in 1996 as a byproduct of political and ideological disagreements 
with a recently restored democracy in 1990.5 The elected government of the Nepali 
Congress Party (NCP) immediately mobilized a police force to combat the insurgency. In 
2001, with increasing insurgent threats, the parliament declared a state of emergency, 
allowing the Nepalese Army to mobilize against the insurgency along with the police 
forces.6 King Gyanendra, taking this opportunity to move against his democratic 
opponents, suspended the constitution and assumed direct authority as the head of state in 
February 2005. In 2006, a decade after the insurgency began, a nationwide mass 
movement organized by all opposition political parties with the active involvement of 
Maoist cadres successfully overthrew the existing monarchical government, replacing the 
2 Arif Jamal, Shadow War: Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (New York: Melvillehouse, 2009), 47. 
3 S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in Nuclear South Asia,” International Security 33, no. 2 
(Fall 2008), 84. 
4 Arpita Anant, “COIN and Op Sadbhavana in Jammu and Kashmir,” IDSA, Occasional Paper no. 19 
(New Delhi: Institutes of Defense Studies and Analyses, 2011), 16‒20, accessed July 27, 2013, 
http://www.idsa.in/occasionalpapers/CounterinsurgencyandOpSadhbhavanainJammuandKashmir. 
5 Deepak Thapa, “Making the Maoist Insurgency,” in Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to 
Fragile Peace, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 45‒48. 
6 Timothy R. Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” 
Small Wars Journal (April 13, 2009), accessed July 27, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-
maoist-insurgency-in-nepal-and-us-counterinsurgency-doctrine . 
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government with representatives from all opposition political parties, including Maoists, 
and promulgating an interim constitution, effectively bringing the insurgency to an end. 
Eventually, the Maoists (Nepal Communist Party-Maoist) joined main-stream politics 
and successfully enforced its most important agendas, such as abolition of the monarchy, 
election of a constituent assembly, and the provision of federalism in Nepal.7  
Although the insurgency’s end and the Maoists’ participation in the political 
process were hailed as a success, the ten-year-long armed conflict in Nepal had claimed 
more than 13,000 lives and destroyed billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure.8 
Meanwhile, reconciliation efforts between the Maoists and others have produced a 
deadlock in the political process. At the present time, Nepal continues to struggle with 
developing its constitution and consolidating its government. This thesis will examine 
COIN efforts against the Maoists, who eventually became part of the political process. 
Continued consolidation and reconciliation problems raise the question of how we can 
measure success in Nepal. This thesis will provide a comparison between the Nepalese 
state strategy and the Indian government strategy in Kashmir. This analysis will make an 
important contribution to the COIN field. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
In the post-1990 world, with the end of the Cold War, insurgencies present 
unprecedented threats that have been countered in different ways. Insurgencies are a 
critical threat to the nation state because they seek to fundamentally change the prevailing 
national political or social order through the use of violence and political disturbance.9 
With changes in communication and support structures due to globalization, the 
insurgency threat is predicted to continue. We need winning strategies with critical 
7 Santosh B. Poudyal, “Explaining the Success of the Nepal Communist Party Maoist (NCP-M): A 
Comparison of the Maoists Insurgencies in the 21st Century” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2010), 1, accessed July 27, 2013, 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/4953/10Dec_Poudyal.pdf?sequence=1. 
8 Ibid., 62.  
9 Nepal Army, Field Manual for Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School (Directorate General 
of Military Training, Army HQ: Army Publication, 2011), 11‒13. 
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components that will “facilitate the quickest path to overcoming the insurgencies or 
negotiating a political solution.”10 According to Kilcullen’s COIN approach, “a 
successful COIN campaign should both aggressively tackle the insurgency and protect 
the population.”11 Therefore, it is an important field of study for governments and 
scholars.  
The cases of Kashmir and Nepal are important because a careful comparison of 
them will assist us in advancing COIN approaches in the developing world, where 
poverty plays a large role in breeding support for insurgents. These two countries are 
undergoing unprecedented changes that consist of simultaneous democratization, 
consolidation, and economic growth in the globalizing world. The Indian COIN 
campaign in Kashmir is an important case study because it is a long-lasting insurgency in 
a democratic setting involving ethnic and religious minorities. As the world increasingly 
democratizes, such cases will highlight the importance of negotiations along with the use 
of military force in border disputed areas. The Nepal case is also critical because it 
illustrates a COIN strategy in a developing country that is also democratizing, a 
particularly challenging phase according to the theoretical literature.12  
Can we consider the Nepalese case to be a success, or did a focused military 
approach produce irreparable damage to reconciliation efforts, which are now being 
fought out in the formation of a constituent assembly? Do we consider the Kashmir case 
to be successful in the past decade with the decline in violence, or is this a lull in the 
cycle of violence that is associated with groups in Pakistan? And very importantly, how 
do these cases contribute to our understanding of COIN approaches? 
This thesis will begin by analyzing these two COIN approaches: population-
centric and enemy-centric. The case of Kashmir, for instance, which currently appears to 
10 Nathan Ray Springer, “Stabilizing the Debate between Population Centric and Enemy Centric 
Counterinsurgency: Success Demands a Balanced Approach” (Art of War Papers, Command and General 
Staff College, Kansas, 2012), 1. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Jack L. Snyder, Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2000), 2‒3.  
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be in the midst of a population-centric approach, presents complexities due to conditions 
in Pakistan as well as, very importantly, a large presence of the military. Therefore, can 
we categorize it as a single approach? The Nepalese COIN, considered successful due to 
the end of a long, violent, Maoist insurgency and insurgent participation in the political 
process, has yet to be consolidated in the civil government. What then leads to the 
successful end of an insurgency? The importance of this study lies in advancing an 
understanding of what feeds insurgencies in the developing world and whether the 
current divisions, as defined in COIN studies, can solve the problem. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis presents its argument by applying a comparative method to the two 
cases of insurgency in Kashmir and Nepal with the purpose of understanding the 
effectiveness of divided COIN studies: the population-centric school and the enemy-
centric school. The population-centric approach employs non-military activities to gain 
popular support and relies on the military only to protect the population from insurgent 
threats.13 The enemy-centric approach focuses on aggressive military operations to deal 
with the enemy by concentrating military efforts on destroying the insurgents’ will and 
capability.14 Every insurgency and countering effort occurs within different 
circumstances and political settings. This consideration demands critical thinking and 
decision making among policy-makers. Therefore, this thesis addresses the question of 
what COIN approach is better for dealing with insurgencies in economically developing 
and democratic settings. It examines the two cases of India and Nepal: what has led to the 
current Indian success in Kashmir, and what led to the failure of Nepal’s COIN campaign 
from 1996 to 2006, affecting consolidation at the national level.  
The primary hypothesis for this thesis is that neither the population-centric nor the 
enemy-centric approach alone is better for dealing with insurgencies in economically 
13 Mark Moyar, “The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin,” Small Wars Journal, 




                                                 
developing democratic settings. Instead, a mixed approach of integrating national 
resources in support of the population and against an insurgency achieves a better 
outcome. The secondary hypothesis is that international aspects also need to be 
considered when mixing these approaches because no developing countries operate in 
isolation; they are deeply influenced by their global strategic position, external players, 
and strategic interests of their neighbors. In the case of Nepal and India, this includes 
players such as China, Pakistan, and the U.S. Therefore, the singular area-focused 
approach, the enemy or the population centric, does not take all the variables into 
account. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature relevant for this thesis includes theories of COIN, the Indian 
government’s strategy in the Kashmir insurgency, the Nepalese government’s strategy in 
addressing the Maoist insurgency, and various scholarly works on insurgencies in 
Kashmir and Nepal. This section provides an overview of this literature primarily 
focusing on COIN theory and practice and the application of different COIN approaches 
in Kashmir and Nepal. First, I define COIN and its enemy-centric and population-centric 
approaches based on theories. Second, I focus on the literature written about the Kashmir 
and Nepal COIN campaigns with a purpose of understanding how these two COIN 
approaches were applied and understood in their specific cases by the state as well as by 
South Asian scholars. The purpose of this section is to highlight the problems in strategy 
used in the region due to the ground realities of economic challenges and democratic 
consolidation, as well as the involvement of international players. 
1. Defining COIN 
COIN theorists argue that the ultimate objective in any COIN campaign is the 
same as any conventional war “to compel our enemy to do our will,” considering COIN 
as a form of warfare.15 To attain this objective, the state has to mobilize its available 
15 John Western, Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 4.  
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resources against threats. COIN, in this context, can be explained in its simplest form as 
the government’s response to insurgency movements. According to the U.S. 
government’s Counterinsurgency Guide, COIN consists of the “comprehensive civilian 
and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain an insurgency and address 
its root causes.”16 Thus, COIN can be defined as an integrated set of political, socio-
economic, security, and information operations aimed at defeating violence, preventing 
recurrences of such violence, and resolving the root causes of an insurgency.17  
While combating the insurgency, some theorists argue, counterinsurgents must 
focus on attacking the insurgents’ center of gravity; others claim protecting one’s own 
center of gravity is more important.18 These theorists explain that insurgent fighters and 
the population are both critical in any COIN environment.19 According to Moore, among 
the COIN campaigns conducted during the last century, “nearly 40 percent succeeded in 
either suppressing the insurgents to a point that proved manageable for security forces or 
ending the insurgency altogether.”20 These explanations establish the two basic ways of 
defeating insurgency on which COIN theorists are divided: the enemy-centric school and 
the population-centric school.21  
2. Enemy-Centric Approach 
Some theorists and policy-makers consider the enemy-centric approach the key to 
defeating insurgency. According to Mark Moyar, to discourage the population from 
supporting an insurgency movement, counterinsurgents have to focus primarily on 
16 U.S. Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, “Counterinsurgency Guide,” 12, 
January 2009, accessed August 2, 2013, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf.  
17 Richard Scott Moore, “The Basics of Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 24, accessed 
August 2, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moorecoinpaper.pdf.   
18 Jack D. Kem, “Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2005), 19‒23, accessed August 14, 2013, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a550354.pdf. 
19 Moyar, “The Third Way of COIN,” 5. 
20 Moore, “The Basics of Counterinsurgency,” 13–14.   
21 Austin Long, Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 9; Colin H. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm: Is There a Failure of 
Counterinsurgency?” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (November/December 2007), 169‒176. 
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aggressive military action against the insurgents’ will and capability.22 He argues that the 
main task of the military is to destroy insurgent fighters first in order to defeat the 
insurgency; a supporting task is to prevent the population from supporting the insurgency 
through a limited campaign of WHAM, such as military-civic action.23 The U.S. COIN 
guide summarizes this approach as: “First defeat the enemy, and all else will follow.”24 
The recent victory of the Sri Lankan government against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) after a long period of conflict is considered a successful example of this 
approach.  
Many scholars view offensive military operations against the insurgency as 
largely wasteful because they do not enhance legitimacy and cannot decisively address 
the socio-economic and political demands of the insurgency.25 According to Moore, 
among various past COIN campaigns, “this approach resulted in repressive and 
authoritarian regimes, many installed by military coup….Counterinsurgency became an 
exercise in continuous suppression.”26 He also states that this approach demands a 
massive military force as well as the willingness to use extreme measures against the 
insurgents that fight from the population base. The coercive response of 
counterinsurgents is likely to lead to the death and casualty of many unarmed and neutral 
populations and to internal displacement, which favors insurgents in gaining popular 
support for their struggle.27 This model involves predominantly the use of military force 
for domination or suppression of insurgents, so there are few scholars arguing in favor of 
the enemy-centric approach. 
Nonetheless, some military officers claim that this approach is successful. Colonel 
C. E. Callwell, with his personal experience in many insurgencies, argues that the enemy-
centric approach is effective for defeating insurgents by killing, wounding, or capturing 
22 Moyar, “The Third Way of COIN,” 5. 
23 Ibid. 
24 U.S. Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, “Counterinsurgency Guide,” 14. 
25 Moyar, “The Third Way of COIN,” 5.  
26 Moore, “The Basics of Counterinsurgency,” 14. 
27 Moyar, “The Third Way of COIN,” 5. 
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them.28 He further expresses the belief that the counterstrokes strategy conducted by 
highly mobile military columns is the most effective way of conducting a war against 
irregulars.29 Colonel Gentil states, “Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable 
operational method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy. There are 
flaws and limitations.”30 Galula, one of the popular proponents of the population-centric 
approach, supports the case conditionally: an “insurgent cannot remain clandestine, 
engaging only in harassing attacks and terrorism indefinitely. Instead, the successful 
insurgents must eventually switchover to a conventional force and defeat the national 
government through conventional means.”31 According to Cox, if this is the case and can 
successfully be identified, counterinsurgents can launch a full-swing military offensive to 
destroy the insurgency.32 According to these scholars, the U.S. battle against Western 
Native American tribes, the British second Boer war in South Africa, French fighting in 
Algeria in 1841, and the Sri Lankan battle against the LTTE are some examples that 
better illustrate the enemy-centric approach in a successful COIN.33 
3. Population-Centric Approach 
The roots of the present population-centric approach can be found in selected 
COIN literature by scholars such as David Galula, Robert Thompson, and Frank Kitson. 
A French military officer, Galula is well recognized in military education and training in 
COIN operations for his contribution to the field of COIN.34 His background in fighting 
28 C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1986), 129‒136. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Gian Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” the Official Home 
Page of the United States Army, Dec 29, 2009, accessed July 29, 2013, 
http://www.army.mil/article/32362/a-strategy-of-tactics-population-centric-coin-and-the-army/.  
31 Dan G. Cox and Thomas Bruscino, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol?” SAMS 
Monograph Series (Three Monographs from the Schools of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011), 3. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Deepak Aneel Boyini, “Explaining Success and Failure: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and India” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey 2010), 2–3, accessed August 1, 2013, 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/5038/10Dec_Boyini.pdf?sequence=1.  
34 Cox and Bruscino, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency,” 2. 
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insurgent movements in Algeria provides him with a unique insight into COIN 
operations. He argues that the government must work with the population to execute 
projects that win the hearts and minds of the people in order to gain legitimacy, which 
then prevents the population from aiding the insurgents.35 Similarly, from their direct 
participation in successful COIN campaigns in Malaya, Vietnam, Burma, and Kenya, 
British theorists and COIN experts Thompson and Kitson stress that winning the hearts 
and minds of the population is the key to success in isolating insurgent fighters from the 
popular base and gaining the population’s support.36 The British COIN campaign in 
Malaya against a Maoist insurgency in the 1950s is an example of a successful 
population-centric approach, a “Hearts and Minds” campaign. 
Other scholars, including Moyar, also argue that the population-centric approach 
mainly focuses on gaining popular support through non-military activities that address 
the “population’s social, political, and economic grievances.”37 He further explains that 
the key to defeating an insurgency is to establish the government’s legitimacy through 
people-oriented programs, such as socio-economic development, people-friendly military 
operations, and information operations. According to this model, the use of military 
operations is also considered valid as a minimum necessary force, but only for protecting 
the population and government activities when necessary.38 Gentile’s work complements 
this view; people are always the focus as the center of gravity, and they have to be 
protected. Thus, to be successful, this effort requires a major investment in time and 
resources because, in nature, this is almost the process of nation building.39 The U.S. 
COIN guide summarizes this strategy as: “First protect and support the population, and 
all else will follow.”40  
35 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2006), viii-ix. 
36 Boyini, “Explaining Success and Failure,” 7. 
37 Moyar, “The Third Way of COIN,” 5. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics,” 6; the U.S. FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency Manual, A-5.  
40 U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, “Counterinsurgency Guide,” 14. 
 10 
                                                 
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., one of the proponents of the population-centric 
approach, claims that “the American army was so conventionally minded and hidebound 
that it was unable to see a better way of population-centric COIN.”41 From the current 
U.S. COIN doctrine to its tactics, however, the U.S. response to COIN is focused 
extensively on the population-centric approach, such as the COIN campaign in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.42 Similarly, John Nagl, one of the most recognized proponents of this 
strategy, claims that “protecting the population was the key to success in any 
counterinsurgency campaign” and the army has to shift away from its “over-reliance on 
firepower to win wars.”43 Like Krepinevich and Nagl, Cox and Thomas contend that a 
“successful COIN can only be achieved through population engagement, stability 
operations, and the creation of a functional state.”44  
In the literature on COIN theories and practices as discussed previously, scholars 
are divided into two main groups in explaining the success or failure of a COIN 
campaign. The population-centric group deals with people’s grievances to gain popular 
support and establish the government’s legitimacy and effectiveness by controlling the 
state’s institutions as the main efforts. As supporting efforts, this group also focuses on 
using limited coercive action to protect the population and other governmental activities 
from insurgent threats. Second, the enemy-centric group focuses mainly on fighting 
against insurgents to destroy their organization, will, and capability in order to defeat 
them physically. This group also advocates a limited WHAM campaign as a supporting 
focus.  
This basic division between population-centric and enemy-centric approaches, 
however, presents problems in explaining the success or failure of a COIN campaign 
against insurgencies in economically developing countries with various complexities, 
41 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), 164–168. 
42 Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics,” 7. 
43 Cox and Bruscino, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency,” 2. 
44 Ibid., 3. 
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such as countries with transitional democratic settings, extensive ethnic mobilizations, 
border problems, and international factors. The two COIN campaigns of Kashmir and 
Nepal present such complexities.  
4. Indian COIN Strategy in the Kashmir Insurgency 
There are two distinct divisions in the Indian strategic thinking community when 
studying the Indian COIN approach in Kashmir. Some argue that Indian COIN efforts are 
guided by the population-centric approach, while others perceive the COIN in Kashmir as 
an enemy-centric approach. Scholars such as K.A. Muthanna, Rahul K. Bhonsle, Arpita 
Anant, David P. Fidler, and V.G. Patankar represent the population-centric work on 
Kashmir insurgency.45 These scholars claim that the current Indian COIN response in 
Kashmir is clearly guided by the population-centric approach that considers population as 
the center of gravity. They also contend that there is a visible change in the attitudes of 
people towards security forces and various governmental projects.46 Similarly, according 
to the Government of India’s Ministry of Home Affairs’ Annual Report 2012–13, despite 
a few violent incidents, people have started participating in well-established political 
processes and socio-economic development. This is illustrated by its normalizing state 
and local-election participation after 2002, the return of tourism, the growth of 
businesses, and an increased Indian center-state involvement on long-term and short-term 
projects.47  
Similarly, the Indian army’s recent doctrine for sub-conventional operations 
(2006) stresses that the army must follow the philosophy of an “Iron Fist in a Velvet 
Glove,” which indicates that the Indian Army’s traditional military-oriented approach is 
45 Anant, “COIN and Op Sadbhavana in Jammu and Kashmir,” 6‒8. 
46 South Asian Terrorist Portal Database, “Jammu and Kashmir Assessment-Year 2012,” accessed 
August 6, 2013, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/assessment2012.htm. 
47 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, “Annual Report 2012‒2013,” 6, accessed July 29, 
2013, http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR(E)1213.pdf. 
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no longer adequate to deal with the Kashmiri insurgency.48 The doctrine emphasizes that 
the conduct of COIN operations must concur with the doctrinal pattern of the people-
centric approach, which highlights the need for maintaining political primacy, a multi-
pronged thrust by all elements of national power, a WHAM campaign by keeping the 
population as the center of gravity, showing deep respect for human rights, increasing 
information operations, and carefully safeguarding the laws of the land.49  
Meanwhile, the use of minimum necessary force is also supported by the doctrine. 
The doctrine states that all actions of the security forces must have a civil face and be 
directed towards strengthening the hands of civil authorities. As argued by Sahukar, this 
is an essential element of the people-centric COIN and a justifiable means against the 
insurgency with heavily foreign-backed, hardcore terrorists while giving a fair 
opportunity to others to cease violence, surrender, and join the moderate main-stream 
politics of the nation.50 These doctrinal aspects are considered critical measures in 
creating a safe and secure environment for other government, political, and socio-
economic initiatives supporting the population and neutralizing insurgent threats in 
Kashmir.  
The second school is represented by scholars who advocate for the enemy-centric 
approach. According to them, the Indian COIN efforts against the Kashmiri insurgency 
supported by jihadis with active Pakistani support are focused on a strong military 
presence in Kashmir. The main proponents of this perspective are practitioners, security 
analysts, and researchers. Indian Army Brigadier General Amritpal Singh, who has 
extensive professional experience in the COIN field and is also a researcher, argues that 
“a conventional bias of the Indian army that is still dominant in the psyche of the army’s 
48 Behram A Sahukar, “The Indian Approach to COIN Operations,” 36, accessed August 8, 2013, 
http://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=http%3A%2F%2Finsurgencyresearchgroup.files.wordpr
ess.com%2F2008%2F03%2Fthe-indian-approach-to-counterinsurgency-operations-v2.doc. (According to 
the author, information is drawn from the annual report of the Government of India, Ministry of Home 
Affairs, 1999‒2006.) 
49 Indian Army, Doctrine on Sub-Conventional Operations-2006 (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters 
of Ministry of Defense-Army, 2006), 41‒56. 
50 Sahukar, “The Indian Approach,” 36. 
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thinkers,” is mainly due to the army’s deployment from a conventional role to a COIN 
role on a rotational basis.51 Similarly, Police Inspector General, K. P. S. Gill, who 
successfully led the COIN campaign against the Punjab insurgency in the early 1990s, is 
a well-recognized security analyst. Under his leadership, the state police were militarized 
and given military roles in the Punjab campaign that led to speedy operations against 
insurgents; this was also referred to as the Gill doctrine.52 
Other proponents of the enemy-centric approach include Rajesh Rajgopalan, a 
noted security scholar who argues that the paramilitary force, the Rashtriya Rifles, a 
dedicated COIN force that integrates an army ethos, equipment, and training to conduct 
COIN has achieved some success in Kashmir.53 Sameer Lalwani agrees with his 
perspective by stating, “A closer look reveals that the Indian approach may be better 
characterized as a strategy of attrition, with the deployment of raw state coercion and an 
enemy-centric campaign to suffocate an insurgency through a saturation of forces.”54 
This author further explains that “when the Indian military has been deployed, it operates 
under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which includes the power of the security 
forces to make preventive arrests, search premises without warrant, and shoot and kill 
civilians.”55  
While explaining the COIN approach in the Kashmir insurgency, these experts 
view the strong coercive response against violent insurgents and cross-border jihadis with 
active Pakistani support as the main reason for the current success of the Indian COIN 
strategy. Citing various significant military efforts to reduce violence, control cross-
51Amrit Pal Singh, “Countering Insurgency in South Asia: Three Approaches,” Small Wars Journal 
(September 23, 2011), accessed December 8, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/countering-
insurgency-in-south-asia-three-approaches. 
52 Sameer Lalwani, “Indian Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem,” CTC 
SENTINEL 4, issue 10 (October 2011), Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, accessed August 2, 
2013, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss107.pdf. 
53 Rajesh Rajgopalan, “Innovations in Counterinsurgency: The Indian Army’s Rashtriya Rifles,” 
Contemporary South Asia 13, no. 1 (March, 2004), 25‒37, accessed September 12, 2013, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0958493042000209852?journalCode=ccsa20#preview. 
54 Lalwani, “Indian Approach to Counterinsurgency.”  
55 Ibid. 
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border infiltration, re-energize political and economic activities, and conduct WHAM 
operations, these scholars advocate strongly for aggressive security operations against the 
insurgents in Kashmir. 
In the literature on the Indian COIN in Kashmir noted previously, we see two 
distinct divisions in the Indian strategic community: the population-centric group and the 
enemy-centric group. These groups place their own claim behind the current success of 
the Kashmir COIN as key. Despite the Indian military’s initial success in preventing 
insurgents from launching large-scale guerrilla warfare and limiting terror acts during the 
1990s, the Indian government seemed ineffective in winning popular support. The public 
continued to confront the security forces, reject the elections of 1996, and provide 
support to the insurgency. After 1998, the state had to adopt a new approach. Some 
important literature on what occurred in the past decades sheds light on the changed 
strategy. As stated by the South Asian Terrorist Portal Database, the gradually declining 
trend of insurgent violence, increasing popular participation in the political process, 
improving economic growth, and returning tourism have been observed in Kashmir since 
2003.56 India adopted a WHAM campaign along with aggressive military deployment in 
Kashmir, which has contributed to the current change in the security situation.57 The 
Indian military remains in Kashmir. This case thus provides the opportunity to explore 
whether the change in the Indian COIN approach from the enemy-centric to the mixed 
approach has led to the current success in Kashmir. 
5. Nepalese COIN Strategy against the Maoist Insurgency 
In Nepal’s COIN campaign against the Maoist insurgency, many studies have 
been done by various international and national scholars, such as Mahendra Lawoti and 
Anup Pahari, Deepak Thapa, Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone and Suman 
Pradhan, and Timothy R. Kreuttner. These scholars argue that Nepal’s COIN effort was 
focused on a heavy military response against the Maoist insurgency, and the Nepalese 
56 South Asian Terrorism Portal, “Annual Casualties and Assessment—Kashmir,” accessed July 13, 
2013, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm. 
57 Ibid., 15. 
 15 
                                                 
government and security forces did not address people’s grievances.58 According to 
Lawoti and Pahari, when Nepal security forces captured and killed a large number of 
Maoist cadres, leaders, and sympathizers who were suspected of being Maoists, this 
attempt to repress the insurgency further escalated the violence, which eventually led to 
failure of the campaign.59 Also, Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan, a noted researcher, 
policy maker, and journalist (respectively), contend that “the army and police’s 
excessively brutal security response alienated many, making it difficult for the state to 
win over the hearts and minds of the general population.”60 According to these scholars, 
Nepal’s military-oriented efforts against the insurgency led to a massive escalation of the 
fighting and a rapidly increased number of battle deaths that made the population turn 
away from supporting the government and security forces.61 
Other proponents include Deepak Thapa, a noted journalist and editor, who 
describes how the state’s neglect of many of its people combined with political instability 
and a military-oriented response to the Maoist insurgency led to Nepal’s COIN failure.62 
According to Kreuttner, “the Nepalese government and security forces failed to balance 
their military approach with social and political issues, which contributed to the state’s 
inability to restore effective governance.”63 Similarly, as John Mackinlay argues, “The 
vital ground was the population, but the government and security forces opted for a 
military campaign that helped to drive the uncommitted communities into the arms of the 
insurgents.”64 As these scholars claim, the Nepal case illustrates that the Nepalese 
government’s overemphasized military approach, directed toward eliminating the 
58 R.C. Poudyal, “Nepal Army and COIN against the Maoist Insurgency” (master’s thesis, Tribhuvan 
University, Nepal, 2012), 5. 
59 Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty 
First Century (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2010), 305‒309. 
60 Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone and Suman Pradhan, Nepal in Transition: from People’s 
War to Fragile Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 20‒23. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Deepak Thapa, A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency 1996 to 2003 (Kathmandu: the 
Printhouse, 2003), 135. 
63 Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 5. 
64 John Mackinlay, “Nepal’s Transition to a Post-Insurgency Era,” The RUSI Journal, 152, no. 3 (June 
18, 2007), 42‒46, accessed July 30, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840701470384. 
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insurgency, became unsuccessful in establishing the government’s legitimacy and 
effectiveness in controlling the state’s institutions.  
According to this literature on Nepal’s COIN, as noted earlier, although the 
Maoists ended their violent efforts and joined the political process, the government’s 
constant emphasis on a military option throughout the campaign ought to be seen as a 
failure.65 This excessive security operation made people lose faith in the state. The 
Maoist insurgents took advantage of this weakness of the government and successfully 
gained popular support. At the same time, they actively pursued armed action against the 
security forces, keeping a political option open.66 As a result, they easily got the upper 
hand in political negotiations, achieved a safe landing, and joined mainstream politics. 
Eventually, this party became the largest political player in Nepalese politics.67 Nepal is 
currently at a critical juncture, where “the process of constitution drafting and political 
transition is deadlocked in a final tussle between Monarchists, Democrats, and the 
Communists,” as argued by Sharma.68 According to the Institute of Peace and Conflicts 
Studies (IPCA) review’s failed state index, the ranking assigned to Nepal in 2013 is 
worse than its ranking in 2005 when Nepal was in the middle of the COIN campaign.69 
As these scholars argue, Nepal’s case shows that the COIN strategy requires not only 
focus on military efforts, which can be counterproductive, but on other aspects to achieve 
success.  
65 Poudyal, “Explaining the Success,” 1‒3. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Manish Thapa, “Role of Civil Society and Political Party in Current Nation/State Building Process 
in Nepal,” National Seminar on New Dynamics of Development: Challenges and Prospects (Lalitpur, 
Nepal: Nepal Administrative Staff College, November 12‒13, 2008), 1–14, accessed August 21, 2013, 
http://www.fesnepal.org/reports/2008/seminar_reports/Paper_cets/paper_thapa.pdf.  
68 Yelisha Sharma, “Nepal and the Failed States Index,” Institute of Peace and Conflicts Studies 




                                                 
6. Why a Third Way: A Mixed Approach? 
Neither the population-centric approach nor the enemy-centric approach 
sufficiently explains what is going on in Nepal and Kashmir. As Galula and Paget point 
out, the mixed approach is more likely to lead to success of the COIN campaign—
depending on various complexities, such as the state of democratic consolidation, 
extensive ethnic mobilization, border problems, and international factors.70 Kilcullen 
further supports this argument that successful counterinsurgencies adopt a mixed 
approach integrating all appropriate national means to aggressively pursue the enemy, 
win over the population, and protect them from insurgent threats and collateral damage.71 
Scholars such as Cox and Bruscino, Moyar, Moore, Springer, and Gentile talk about the 
mixed approach. The two COIN cases of Nepal and Kashmir allow us to understand these 
various arguments on the mixed approach.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will use the comparative method to analyze and explain the increased 
levels of success of the Indian COIN approach in Kashmir and the failure of Nepal’s 
COIN approach against Maoists and, specifically, what led to the current Indian success 
in Kashmir and Nepal’s failure at home. In this thesis, I compare and analyze COIN 
strategies of the mixed Indian approach against the Kashmiri insurgency and Nepal’s 
enemy-centric approach against its Maoist insurgency as independent variables, which 
lead to variations in the outcome of the COIN campaigns. 
Another independent variable in this research is a COIN strategy with a purely 
population-centric approach. This will, however, not be analyzed and compared here 
because there really have not been any cases where a purely population-centric approach 
was used throughout the campaign. For example, even in the British COIN campaign in 
Malaya—considered one of the most successful population-centric COIN strategies—the 
aggressive military operation ‘Search and Destroy’ was used to weaken armed elements 
70 Boyini, “Explaining Success and Failure,” 9. 
71 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 1. 
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of insurgency, combined with an effective population re-settlement program WHAM that 
took away the insurgents’ base of support.72 In any COIN environment there is always, 
by definition and execution, organized and purposeful use of violence by both insurgents 
and counterinsurgents. More or less, and either earlier, later or throughout the campaign, 
coercion has to play a role to successfully settle the conflict along with other elements, 
such as political, economic, and people-oriented programs.73 Moreover, depending on the 
specific circumstances—for example, the state of economically challenged democratic 
settings, widespread ethnic mobilization, extensive external and internal support to the 
insurgency, border problems, and international factors—a purely population-centric 
approach is less likely to serve the purpose of counterinsurgents, as illustrated by various 
historical cases.74 Thus, it is not worth investigating this category of case.  
When analyzing the dependent variable, the outcome of the COIN campaign is 
defined by the degree of success in eliminating the armed insurgent threat.75 There are 
mainly two conditions for this outcome: First, the degree to which people consider the 
government legitimate and effective in controlling social, political, and economic 
institutions that meet the needs of the population include adequate mechanisms to address 
grievances.76 Second, the degree of marginalization of insurgents to the point at which 
they are destroyed, reduced to irrelevance in numbers and capability, or co-opted into 
government mechanisms.77  
The degree of success and failure of these two conditions is measured by success 
of the political and electoral process, economic growth, violent incidents, individual 
freedom, establishment and improvement of infrastructure, rehabilitation of the displaced 
population, the effective functioning of basic popular services, and the restoration of 
72 Gian, “A Strategy of Tactics,” 8‒9. 
73 Cox and Bruscino, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency,” 8. 
74 Boyini, “Explaining Success and Failure,” 9. 
75 U.S. Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, “Counterinsurgency Guide,” 4.  
76 Ibid.   
77 Ibid. 
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urban facilities.78 This thesis attempts to explain how the mixed approach of the Indian 
COIN in Kashmir has contributed to the current success as compared to Nepal’s failure 
from 1996 to 2006. For this research purpose, I will use primary as well as secondary 
sources.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The introductory chapter includes the 
research question with a contextualized background (identifying importance, problems, 
and hypotheses), a literature review, and methodology. Chapter II discusses the 
insurgency and COIN in Kashmir, explaining the background of the Kashmir insurgency, 
underlying factors sustaining the insurgency, the present state of the insurgency, and the 
Indian COIN approach in Kashmir. To measure current success in Kashmir, the 
insurgency situation and the impact of the Indian COIN approach will be analyzed. This 
chapter will divide the Indian COIN campaigns into two periods—from 1989 to 1998, 
and from 1998 to the present—in order to evaluate the increased level of success in 
Kashmir.  
Chapter III focuses on the insurgency and COIN in Nepal, explaining the 
background of the Maoist insurgency, analysis of the insurgency and Nepalese COIN 
approach. To measure the outcome of the COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006, Nepal’s 
COIN approach will be analyzed here. This chapter will divide the Nepalese security 
operations of the COIN campaign into two periods—from 1995 to 2000 and from 2001 to 
2006—in order to evaluate the increased level of success in Kashmir. In Chapter IV, this 
thesis does a comparative analysis of the Indian and Nepalese COIN campaigns, also 
explaining the post-1998 success of the Kashmir COIN, the failure of Nepal’s COIN 
effort, and lessons learned from these campaigns. This analysis will be useful for 
understanding the importance of the mixed approach for better success of the COIN 
campaigns. The final chapter will conclude the thesis with some findings and policy 
78 John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, “Rethinking Counterinsurgency,” RAND 
Counterinsurgency Study 5 (2008), 61, accessed August 28, 2013, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.5.pdf. 
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recommendations. The thesis attempts to highlight how correctly adopting COIN 
strategies will influence the degree of success or failure of COIN campaigns. This 
analysis will be useful for understanding the importance of the mixed approach for better 
success of the COIN campaigns.  
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II. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN KASHMIR 
In order to explain and analyze the insurgency and the Indian COIN campaign in 
Kashmir, it is essential to understand the core issues that led to the insurgency’s birth, 
growth, and sustainment, and the Indian COIN efforts in different periods of time in 
Kashmir. Kashmir is the most contentious issue that has strained the relation between 
India and Pakistan since their partition in 1947 as it is widely considered by Pakistanis as 
an unfinished agenda of the partition. India and Pakistan have already fought three full-
scale wars over Kashmir in 1947, 1965, and 1971 and one localized war in 1999. They 
have also been engaged in a nuclear capability race since the 1970s.79  
In addition, on the domestic front in India, from 1989 to the present, some among 
the Kashmiri people have been engaged in an insurgency against the Indian central and 
state government in Kashmir. A movement of Kashmiri Muslims, the Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), launched a guerrilla rebellion against the Indian rulers 
aimed at liberating Kashmir from India and reuniting it with Pakistani-controlled 
Kashmir as a single independent state from 1989.80 Besides local Kashmiri insurgents, 
Islamic fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries from the Middle East 
assist Kashmiri insurgents. This insurgency continues to evolve primarily with Pakistani 
support to insurgents.81 Therefore, the Kashmir insurgency is complex and consists of 
multiple players, such as India, Pakistan, and segments of the Kashmiri Muslim 
population.  
In response, since 1990, India mobilized and maintained a large military presence 
to fight the insurgency in Kashmir and control the terrorists’ infiltration and exfiltration 
across the Line of Control (LOC). India has also adopted a WHAM campaign with 
79 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in 
South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 14‒19. 
80 Raju G.C. Thomas, “India’s Security Environment, Towards the Year 2000,” Conference Paper  on 
the U.S. War College’s Strategic Studies Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(July 1996), 3, accessed July 18, 2013, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub118.pdf. 
81 Ibid., 9. 
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massive security operations, political process, and socio-economic development 
programs. These efforts against the Kashmiri insurgency have experienced failure and 
success at various junctures and the campaign is an ongoing one.  
This chapter analyzes the roots, growth, and sustainment of the insurgency and 
the Indian government’s COIN efforts against it. The focus of this chapter will be on the 
Indian government’s COIN strategy from 1989 to the present in order to measure the 
recent Indian success in the economically challenged, democratizing setting of Kashmir. 
The insurgency in Kashmir is linked with territorial dispute, extensive ethnic 
mobilization, and active external support. This research will illustrate that the mixed 
COIN approach of integrating all appropriate national resources to aggressively pursue 
the enemy, win over the population, and protect them from insurgents’ violence and 
collateral damage is more likely to lead to success in the COIN campaign in such a 
complex situation. This is unlike the situation in Nepal, where the Nepalese government 
overemphasized the militarist approach throughout the campaign against the Maoists, 
which I will demonstrate in the next chapter. Here, I compare the Indian approach in 
different phases of the Kashmiri insurgency to some elements of COIN theories and the 
approaches taken in Nepal, which outline some essential prerequisites for the success of 
the counterinsurgency campaign. These elements include adherence to political methods 
of addressing the people’s grievances, overall socio-economic development in the 
insurgency-affected region, and an effective security operation to defeat the armed 
elements of insurgency and protect the population from violence. An analysis of these 
aspects will identify whether the Indian mixed COIN approach has led to the current 
success in Kashmir, or whether this success is due to the change in the role of Pakistan 





A. BACKGROUND OF THE INSURGENCY IN KASHMIR 
The insurgency in Kashmir dates back to the mid-to late-1980s, but it is rooted in 
pre-1947 British India. The insurgency has claimed over 50,000 lives and led to the 
internal displacement of about 200,000 Kashmiri Hindus and some neutral Muslims.82 In 
order to gain a better understanding of this issue, it is essential to begin with the brief pre-
partition history of British India, which provides the background of political and social 
discontent among the majority Muslim population against the Hindu rule in Kashmir. 
Second, an understanding of the history of denial of democratic rights and institutions to 
the people of Kashmir and social imbalance in post-partitioned Kashmir is also required. 
The third important factor is to know why and how Kashmir strained relations between 
India and Pakistan, and why Pakistan played an actively supportive role in this 
insurgency. Last, the analysis of the Kashmiri insurgency attempts to present the 
complexity of the Kashmiri insurgency, from the grassroots level to the international 
level that India has been fighting for more than two decades.  
1. Pre-Partition India and Internal Politics in Kashmir
During the British rule in India, an inadequate political and social system under a 
Hindu Maharaja’s administration led to dissatisfaction among the Muslim population. At 
the time, Jammu and Kashmir were home to a number of ethnic and religious groups with 
a population that was 77 percent Muslim, 20 percent Hindu, and 3 percent others (mostly 
Sikh and Buddhist).83 The Muslim majority in Kashmir had been ruled by minority 
Hindu kings for a century from 1846 to1947. The majority population viewed the 
government of the Maharaja and the Hindu minority population as oppressing the 
majority because the Hindu minority population owned most of the land, controlled the 
education system, and occupied a significant number of seats in the state’s civil 
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administration and military.84 As claimed by Bakaya and Bhatti, while a very few 
Muslims were educated and given access to government jobs, most Muslims remained 
uneducated and underemployed by the state.85 According to them, it is possible that the 
Muslim population experienced social discrimination under Hindu rulers because many 
Kashmiri Muslims were Hindus before they were forced to convert to Islam during 
Afghan Rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.86 
The unequal treatment of the Muslim majority under Hindu rule would become 
the foundation for the separatist movement. The movement first appeared in 1932, when 
Mohammed Sheikh Abdullah, a Kashmiri Muslim leader, started a peaceful movement, 
All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (MC), for social and political change in 
Kashmir. Ultimately, MC gave a space for the people’s dissatisfaction and frustration to 
surface in Kashmir.87 From the 1930s to the mid-1940s, the political movement in 
Kashmir gained momentum, changing its course from the Muslim Conference (MC) in 
1931 to a Muslim and non-Muslim alliance named the National Conference (NC) in 1939 
and the Quit Kashmir Movement targeted against the Maharaja in 1946.88 This 
movement was an initiative of NC for a revolutionary overthrow of the Maharaja’s 
regime, which became a landmark in the history of political mobilization against the state 
in Kashmir. All these efforts from the 1930s to 1940s solely focused on the issue of 
political and social imbalance in Kashmir.  
2. Kashmir during Partition
During the partition in 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, was asked to 
choose one side between India and Pakistan, but he remained undecided. Following the 
84 Ibid., 16‒19. 
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partition, Kashmir became an independent nation with an understanding that it would 
soon decide whether to join secular India or Muslim Pakistan due to the democratic 
movement led by the NC.89 Having close trade and transport links with Pakistan’s North 
Western Frontier Province (NWFP), and Western Punjab, the Maharaja signed the—
Standstill Agreement—with the government of Pakistan.90  
The Standstill Agreement did not last long before Muslim rebels from Kashmir 
and Pakistani army members disguised as tribesmen started to revolt against the Maharaja 
from Poonch, Muzaffarabad, and Mirpur. The situation in Kashmir became hostile and 
the uprising was initially successful in capturing the territory, including the capital of 
Srinagar, which directly threatened the Maharaja’s government.91 This uprising resulted 
in violence committed against the Hindu minority living in Jammu and Kashmir and the 
government of the Maharaja. He became unable to regain control, which forced him to 
request military assistance from India. The Maharaja sent Sheikh Abdullah to New Delhi 
seeking Indian military assistance because Abdullah was a politically elected leader, who 
represented the people of Kashmir. Without an official request for accession, India 
refused to provide military assistance. Therefore, the Maharaja signed the Statement of 
Accession with India. Immediately, India deployed its military to Kashmir. The Indian 
army alongside the local Kashmiris fought against the invaders.92  
3. Indian Role in Kashmir
The first war in 1948–49 left the state of Jammu and Kashmir divided between 
India and Pakistan as Indian occupied Kashmir (IOK) and Pakistani Occupied Kashmir 
(POK). IOK became one of the states of the Indian Union under Indian Constitution, 
Article 37093 and POK was called Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) under Pakistani control. 
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As Bose states, India and Pakistan have made their position clear since then “to make 
possession of Kashmir the cornerstone of their respective identities as states.”94  
In the post-partition history of Kashmir, one of the most important factors 
supporting the growth of the insurgency is the history of denial of democratic rights and 
institutions to the Kashmiri people due to a combination of political control from New 
Delhi, incompetent handling of the domestic situation by the state government of 
Kashmir, and an increased level of awareness among the population from education and 
media exposure.95 First, Kashmir had acceded to the Indian union only with regards to 
defense, foreign affairs, and communications portfolios as all other princely states, and 
the special status of Kashmir was well recognized in the Indian Constitution.96 As Bose 
argues, over time, Kashmiri autonomy granted under the Indian Constitution was eroded 
as the Indian government consistently began pursuing more centralized authoritarian 
policies toward Kashmir and imposing heavy-handed antiterrorism laws, manipulating 
election results, and gradually centralizing power in Delhi, which resulted in the 
increasing deinstitutionalization of Kashmiri politics.97 The elected governments of 
Kashmir had little legitimacy with the Kashmiri public.  
Second, due to the blessing from New Delhi, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, a 
close ally of the center, monopolized the power and politics of the state. He never 
allowed any opposition party to enter into Kashmiri politics.98 This trend continued 
throughout the period of the 1950s to the 1980s. The state government run by Abdullah’s 
Jammu Kashmir National Conference party became highly corrupt and ineffective at 
addressing the genuine grievances of the population.  
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Third, in the 1970 and 1980s, due to the policies of both the Kashmiri National 
Conference and Indian central government, the educational institutions, literacy rates, and 
access to mass media flourished in Kashmir, which resulted in the freedom of speech and 
great political awareness among Kashmiris.99 The overall literacy rate in Jammu and 
Kashmir increased more than 43 percent, the third-fastest growth rate in the nation.100 At 
the same time, the rapid spread of Muslim schools, madrassas, throughout Kashmir 
increased the sentiments of Islamic activism. This was due to the Soviet-Afghan war 
taking place in the region, which provided large resources to the Muslim fundamentalists. 
This will be discussed in the next section. These developments coupled with rising 
unemployment and declining economic prosperity created a more politically conscious 
younger generation, who had a better understanding of the social and political situations 
that affected their lives.101 This factor ultimately dragged them towards violent groups. 
Thus, the combination of political mobilization and institutional decay in Kashmir, as 
discussed earlier, gave motivation to organize the mass protests against the Indian policy 
in Kashmir.102  
During the 1980s, the already developed discontent and frustration among the 
Kashmiri people became even more exacerbated when the Indian government led by 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi began pursuing more centralized and repressive policies 
against the issue of separatists’ demands and also against those opposing the centralizing 
authority in Delhi.103 New Delhi’s manipulation of the election results of 1983 and 1987 
in order to suppress the separatist movement of Kashmiri Muslims and prevent them 
from gaining power and the people’s support placed the Kashmiris under violent 
confrontation, and this produced mistrust in Kashmir towards New Delhi’s authority.104 
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Subsequently, the mass protests and popular mobilization supporting militancy increased 
in the valley.  
The final turning point happened on December 8, 1989, when the daughter of the 
Indian Minister of Home Affairs, Dr. Rubiya Sayeed, was kidnapped by members of the 
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) as she was leaving the government hospital in 
Srinagar.105 Following this incident, New Delhi promulgated and implemented the 
Terrorists and Destructive Activities Prevention Acts to crack down on the anti-Indian 
movement, which granted the local law enforcement agencies the right to search and 
detain pro-secessionist groups.106 From 1988 to 1989, the police regularly put down 
strikes, protests, and violence organized by local youths and secessionists. Day by day, 
the situation experienced further lawlessness that ultimately beefed up the spiral of 
violence. As a result, the majority of young Kashmiris started joining the militancy.107  
As the confrontation continued, other armed groups joined the movement, and the 
clash between security forces and insurgent groups expanded throughout Kashmir 
rapidly. Among other militant groups operating in the beginning were the prominent 
JKLF and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).108 By early 1990, the situation in Kashmir turned 
from local terrorism to growing insurgency.109 To fight insurgency, India enforced the 
Kashmir Disturbed Act of 1990, which essentially put Kashmir under presidential rule.110 
The Indian Army and police forces were then free to conduct unrestrained COIN 
operations and use all available means necessary to regain control.111  
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4. Pakistani Role in Kashmir
According to Patankar, the insurgency in Kashmir was not started by Pakistan, but 
by “the insurgency entangled in Pakistani efforts to continue its long-standing attempts to 
wrest Kashmir from India.”112 Apart from Indian misrule and undemocratic and 
inefficient Kashmiri politics, Pakistan from the beginning of the partition continuously 
attempted to take control over Kashmir by using all state and non-state means available 
as well as international actors. In 1964, Pakistan attempted to ignite internal rebellion 
against Indian occupation in Kashmir through Operation Gibraltar that was followed by 
Operation Grand Slam, but Kashmiri separatist groups did not support them, and Pakistan 
became completely unsuccessful. Later in the 1980s, the change in Pakistani politics and 
society during General Zia ul-Haq’s administration primarily altered the type of violence 
in Kashmir. Mainly there are two aspects, which are important to note here.  
First, Pakistan became one of the major channels for open and secret international 
military aid, including arms and funding to Afghani Mujahidin to fight against Soviet 
occupation in Afghanistan.113 The military aid was coming from the U.S. China, and 
various Arab countries through Pakistan. With active Pakistani support, trained, armed, 
and experienced Mujahidin fighters were shifted to Kashmir to support the insurgency 
after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.114 In addition, foreign fighters began 
arriving in Kashmir from other countries of the Middle East to assist the insurgents’ 
struggle against Indian rule.115 Foreign jihadi fighters brought unique strength to bolster 
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local insurgents in Kashmir.116 According to Jamal, there were about 2,500 Pakistani-
backed insurgents operating in Kashmir at any time after 1993.117  
Second, according to Jamal, additional safe and secure training camps were 
established on the Pakistani side of Kashmir, and Pakistan also began to arm and train 
Kashmiri youth who crossed the LOC for training to fight insurgency operations against 
India. These youths were given continuous moral and material support as well as 
intelligence in the mid-1980s and 1990s. The pro-Kashmiri independence group, JKLF, is 
one of the organizations that was initially trained and supported by Pakistan. This later 
became a pro-Pakistani group in the 1980s. This group conducted a violent movement for 
Kashmiri independence and was responsible for much of the violence in Kashmir prior to 
the outbreak of the Islamist insurgency in 1989.118 JKLF also engaged in hijacking 
aircraft and in the kidnapping and killing of diplomats and politicians within and outside 
Kashmir. Militants in Kashmir relied continuously on training and support provided from 
Pakistan and the Kashmiri diaspora.  
Even after the insurgency broke out in Kashmir, Pakistan’s initiative to take 
advantage of the Kashmiri uprising and deteriorated security situation played a crucial 
role in growing and sustaining the insurgency in Kashmir. Various scholars contend that 
Pakistan openly supported Kashmiri separatists with extensive financial and material 
support.119 According to Byman, “Pakistan, one of the most generous sponsors of 
insurgent groups in the 1990s, provided tens of millions of dollars to its favored 
movements.”120 The external assistance by the Kashmiri diaspora living in Europe and 
America and some Islamic charities were directly lobbied on the Kashmiri’s behalf by 
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Pakistan.121 The cost to fund this insurgency was estimated to be $125 million to $250 
million per year and was provided through Pakistan.122  
Various scholars such as T.V. Paul and Peter Chalk argue that the strategy of 
Pakistan in Kashmir is a low-cost, high-gain option, which has been considered as a 
means of balancing the asymmetries between the two countries in the Kashmiri 
theatre.123 As the recent RAND Corporation report argues, “the use of militant groups, 
including the Taliban, has remained an important instrument for Pakistan’s security 
forces in its regional strategy.”124 Pakistani influence and support to the Kashmiri 
insurgency, therefore, has become very critical in sustaining the insurgency. Pakistan has 
used the insurgency as a subversive ‘proxy war’ strategy against Indian rule in 
Kashmir.125  
5. Analysis of the Kashmiri Insurgency
According to these contextual reviews as mentioned previously, the Kashmiri 
insurgency has evolved in an economically developing democratic setting that has 
extensive ethnic and religious mobilization, problematic border relations with Pakistan, 
and active external support. After partition, India continuously attempted to bring 
Kashmir under the control of the center although that was not the mandate promised to 
the Kashmiri people by the Nehru administration. Economically, while the center poured 
some resources into Kashmir, the lack of focus on distribution created immense 
discontent among the majority population. The center’s and the state’s policies of the 
liberalization of education and mass media in the1970s changed the awareness level of 
the Kashmiris and helped to raise their already surfaced frustration and dissatisfaction. 
121 Huntington P Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of the New World Order (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 274. 
122 Chalk, “Pakistan Role in Insurgency,” 3. 
123 Ibid., 1. 
124 Ibid. 
125Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, “Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear 
Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis,” monograph (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 2001), 97. 
33 
Thus, the birth of the Kashmiri insurgency was caused mainly by the Indian internal 
mismanagement of Kashmiri politics.  
As far as the growth and sustainment of the insurgency in Kashmir is concerned, 
there are not only internal factors, but also regional and international factors playing a 
significant role. There are conflicting interests among the players, such as India, Pakistan, 
and the Kashmiri population. For both the nuclear states, India and Pakistan, giving up on 
Kashmir is unacceptable because of their political and security interests. The Kashmiris 
themselves lack a common stance on the issue of the status of Kashmir: whether to 
support independence or statehood under Indian union, or to become part of Pakistan. 
The insurgency in Kashmir, therefore, is one of the most complex and complicated 
insurgencies from the individual to the international level. First, in human terms, the 
Kashmir conflict has already cost the lives of an estimated 40,000 to 80,000 people and 
made refugees of 400,000.126 Due to the impact of this conflict, the long-standing 
integrated sense of Kashmiriyat (Kashmiriness), the ethno-national, and social 
consciousness, and the cultural values of the Kashmiri identity have been fading away.127  
Second, the Kashmiri population lacks the common stance regarding the identity 
of Kashmir, which has played an important role in sustaining the insurgency in Kashmir. 
The rival Muslim insurgent groups are also divided on their political preferences and they 
very often fight among themselves on the issue of accession into Pakistan or 
independence from India.128 The minority population from other religious communities, 
such as Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and some moderate Muslims, are in favor of 
maintaining the current Indian center-state political structure. They consider that Kashmir 
can be politically and economically developed and stable under a secular participatory 
democratic, economically emerging, and militarily growing India. But, they are 
continuously targeted and forced to flee from Kashmir by terrorists.129 
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Third, from the regional point of view, a country without Kashmir is in no way 
acceptable for both India and Pakistan and that has also fueled sustaining the insurgency 
in Kashmir. The Indian stance is that Kashmir is an integral part of its inclusive 
democratic and secular nation state. It believes that the loss of its only Muslim-majority 
region, Kashmir, could instigate other states to demand autonomy, thus destroying a 
long-practiced, constitutionally secular India.130 Pakistan holds Kashmir on the top of its 
national political agenda. It perceives that a Pakistan without Kashmir is territorially and 
ideologically incomplete. There are strong stances among the Pakistani military 
community, extremist Islamic groups, and politicians on the Kashmir issue.131 These 
Indian and Pakistani stances on Kashmir have also added energy to the Kashmiri 
population not taking either side but struggling for independence in Kashmir. In addition, 
there has been continuous fighting between Pakistani proxies and Indian security forces 
for more than two decades. 
Fourth, from the international perspective, Kashmir is likely to remain among the 
most dangerous existing conflicts in the modern world.132 India and Pakistan have 
already fought four wars since their independence in 1947. After the successful test of 
nuclear weapons in May 1998, both of them are now nuclear capable and focused to 
achieve the catastrophic defeat of one another. In this context, the prevailing condition of 
the Pakistani state and military, which are connected with the armed militancy in 
Kashmir and the extremist Islamic terrorist groups within Pakistan, is more alarming and 
likely to lead to future crises over Kashmir. Arriving at a common solution to such a 
complex insurgency that addresses interests of all the key actors as noted previously is 
extremely troublesome.  
On the other hand, the rise of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was not only due to 
political exclusion, bad governance, and socio-economic-cultural inequalities that 
prevailed in the 1990s, but also to the continuation of the radical leftist movement of 
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Nepal since 1949. The Maoist insurgency was a completely internal security problem, 
which ended in 2006 when a nationwide mass movement was organized by the Maoists 
along with all opposition political parties. This movement led to a comprehensive peace 
agreement, the negotiated political settlement that accommodated the most important 
demands of the Maoist insurgents. The next chapter will illustrate this. 
B. INDIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN KASHMIR  
The Indian government has been involved in various COIN campaigns since its 
partition in 1947. The Kashmir insurgency is one of the most complex, longest, and most 
serious internal security problems as discussed earlier, one which contains conflicting 
interests among multiple players, such as India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri people. These 
interests include the independence of Kashmir by the majority of Kashmiri Muslims, 
preservation of a secular nation fought for by India, and unification of the Muslim state 
claimed by Pakistan. Kashmir also presents international border complexity with 
Pakistan, on which India and Pakistan have already fought four conventional wars. 
Since 1989, India has mobilized its security forces to fight the insurgency and 
maintain internal peace and security in Kashmiri. This ongoing COIN campaign has 
experienced failure and success at various junctures. While analyzing the level of 
success, some variables of the mixed approach, which are considered to be the essential 
prerequisites for the success of the COIN campaign, will be evaluated. These variables 
include effective security operations to defeat the armed elements of insurgency and 
protect the population from violence along with a WHAM campaign, a political way of 
addressing the people’s grievances, and the overall socio-economic development in the 
insurgency-affected region. In order to measure the level of success, the COIN campaign 
is divided into the phases: the first phase from 1989 to 2000 and the second phase from 
2001 to 2013. The campaign is divided into two phases because after 2001, the Indian 
COIN strategy shifted from a singular approach, an aggressive military response, to a 
mixed approach that included continuing massive military deployment along with people-
oriented programs, such as a campaign to win hearts and minds, socio-economic 
development programs, dialogue with local groups, and a legitimate political process.  
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1. First Phase (From 1989 to 2000) 
a. Security Operations 
Indian COIN strategy from 1989 to 2000 in Kashmir was a singular—military 
only—approach to counter the separatist insurgency operating with strong Pakistani 
support. The Indian government mobilized the Indian military of roughly 300,000 to 
conduct a full-scale COIN campaign battling dozens of insurgent groups across 
Kashmir.133 The majority of Kashmiri people blamed India for doing too little, too late, 
and for generally ignoring the Kashmiri politics and problems. Also, the Indian military 
with this massive strength was criticized widely by its own people and government 
officials for being unable to bring insurgency to an end in Kashmir in the 1990s. Two 
significant factors, internal and external, demanded the strong military response to the 
insurgency in this phase.  
First, the internal factor was the security situation in Kashmir in the 1990s, which 
was marked by the complete breakdown of civil authority and the loss of control of a 
large part of the Kashmir valley to separatist Muslim insurgents.134 According to 
Sahukar, the local state police force was subverted and ineffective. The central police and 
paramilitary forces inserted into Kashmir had little sympathy for the Kashmiris. The 
central police force was not even trained and equipped to control mass demonstrations 
and counter well-equipped and experienced jihadi fighters. Human rights abuses and the 
indiscriminate use of force coupled with wide-spread arrests and allegations of torture 
isolated the population and encouraged the militancy.135 In addition to these flaws, New 
Delhi’s frequent political interference in state affairs, widespread corruption of the state 
administration, an almost non-existent economic agenda of center and state, and India’s 
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firm stance against the religious separatist demands caused even more deterioration in the 
situation in Kashmir.  
Second, the external factor was Pakistan’s role in Kashmir, which provided 
extensive external support to the Kashmiri insurgents through InterService Intelligence 
(ISI).136 Pakistan established safe and secure training camps in many areas in Pakistani-
occupied Kashmir, which started to provide the extensive material, training, and 
intelligence support to Kashmiri insurgents. Foreign jihadi fighters also joined the armed 
struggle through Pakistan. At any time after 1993, there were about 2,500 Pakistani-
backed insurgents operating in Kashmir.137 Their financial support was provided by the 
Kashmiri diaspora living outside the country and some Islamic charities, which were 
directly lobbied on the Kashmiri’s behalf by Pakistan.138 These active external supports 
to the insurgency posed a real danger to the security and law and order situation of 
Kashmir. Kashmiri authority and Indian security forces could not protect Hindus living in 
the Muslim-dominated Srinagar Valley. They were terrorized, targeted, and ultimately 
forced to leave Kashmir by the terrorists.139 Pakistan’s influence on the Kashmiri 
violence, thus, became more apparent and evolved as a subversive ‘proxy war’ with India 
throughout the 1990s. This external factor forced the Indian government to respond to the 
insurgency militarily in Kashmir.  
In the mid-1990s, the Indian security forces’ COIN operations effectively 
neutralized the insurgents’ overall capability by reducing their violent attacks in Kashmir. 
One of the most successful tactics employed by the Indian military during this period was 
the use of captured or surrendered militants to identify other key terrorist personnel, 
hideouts, plans, and weapon caches.140 By 1996, most of the Kashmiri insurgent guerrilla 
operations were largely neutralized as was witnessed by their fragmentation into a 
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number of new factions. Their tactics shifted dramatically from regular direct attacks on 
the Indian security forces to the limited terror acts against the Kashmiri minorities. These 
terror acts later proliferated rapidly all over India.141 According to Indian Army sources, 
there were 177 different organizations in 1992, which later, coalesced into 31 major 
groups by 2002.142 According to the South Asian Terrorist Portal Database, the annual 
casualty rate from the preceding three years was nearly 3,000; by the end of 1996, totals 
had fallen to 2,372.143  
As argued by various scholars, the effective operations by Indian security forces 
in the mid-1990s is also considered as a viable reason for the Kargil War of 1999, which 
helped the insurgency to be revived in Kashmir. As Ganguly argues, “with the defeat of 
the guerrillas in Kashmir in 1996, Pakistan feared that the insurgency was slowly 
dissipating over time, with most Kashmiris losing their will to continue the insurgency. 
Therefore, Pakistan needed to show its determination and support to the Kashmiri 
insurgents who were still fighting and hoped to inspire passive Kashmiris to renew 
aspirations of self-determination.”144 Equally, the international pressure and support for 
the Kashmiris were losing energy, with many external support groups and Islamic 
governments beginning to believe the insurgency was lost.145 As Ganguly and Kapur 
claim, “It was the very success of India’s counterinsurgency strategy that promoted 
Pakistan’s decision makers to pursue a limited probe in the Kargil region of Kashmir in 
1999.”146 Thus, a major obstacle for India during this period was the continuous 
Pakistani support to the insurgents and involvement of foreign jihadi fighters and their 
religious fervor that made winning the COIN campaign very difficult by military means.  
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b. Political Process 
For the first time after the insurgency broke out, New Delhi attempted to re-
energize the political process by holding state and local assembly elections in 1996. 
Though insurgents boycotted the election and threatened voters, officials, and individuals 
not to participate in the election, the National Conference (NC) led by Farooq Abdullah, 
Delhi’s close and long ally, won the election.147 In the local assembly, one of the 
surrendered insurgents, Muhammad Yousef Parray, was elected and started working 
closely with the Indian security forces. This step encouraged other militants to denounce 
the violence and join the mainstream society as well. As a result, both the Indian army 
and Kashmiri insurgents agreed to form the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and 
use it as mediation institution for further interactions.148  
Due to the lack of political and socio-economic programs, however, the reform 
and integration of the captured and surrendered insurgents into main-stream society did 
not gain the expected momentum. Farooq Abdullah and the newly elected local leaders 
failed to fulfill their promises made in the election campaign and left all parties 
unsatisfied. In response, New Delhi promptly suspended the power transferred to the 
state-elected body just after the 1996 election along with the proposal to withdraw the 
Indian military from Kashmir.149 Thus, Kashmir throughout the1990s remained under 
New Delhi’s rule without any local political representatives in the state administration. 
The Indian government’s diplomatic efforts to solve the Kashmiri insurgency in 
the 1990s can also be characterized as nonexistent, except for very few bilateral 
engagements. The proxy war in Kashmir changed significantly when Indian Prime 
Minister Atal B. Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif established a 
number of confidence-building measures meant to lower tensions over Kashmir in the 
147 Amin Masoodi, “Kuka Parray’s Killing - A Setback to the Peace Process,” IPCS Terrorism Project 
(New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2003), 1, accessed August 19, 2013, 
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process-1162.html. 
148 K Santhanam and Sudhir Saxena, “Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery” (New 
Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2003), 215‒223. 
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late 1990s.150 These confidence-building measures led to a general sense in the region 
that the Indian and Pakistani politicians, if they were seriously involved in negotiation, 
would find a peaceful settlement bilaterally. It was expected to be one of the most 
important developments towards major concessions on both sides, but it could not be 
implemented due to the Pakistani incursion into Kargil in 1999. According to the Crises 
Group Report, “If implemented, the deal would have most likely entailed Indian and 
Pakistani recognition of the Line of Control as the permanent border.”151  
c. Socio-Economic Programs  
During the 1990s, the Indian economic focus to address the socio-economic 
grievances of Kashmiri people was least prioritized. Many Indian scholars claim that, 
although India was trying to improve the Kashmiri economy by expanding health care, 
the transportation system, education, and the media, the lack of any long-term 
development plan and strategy, including the high unemployment rate and economic 
disparities among Kashmiris, did not produce any positive outcome because of lack of 
organized focus on a development strategy at the local level. Instead, this contributed to 
dissatisfaction and the growth of radical Islamic insurgents.152  
Another important pillar of the Kashmiri economy is domestic and international 
tourism. The impact of the violent activities of insurgents and COIN operations in the 
1990s could clearly be seen in the tourism industry, which suffered immensely. The 
arrival of tourist had declined substantially since the late 1990s when militancy gained 
momentum. According to Sharma, “The number of tourists visiting the state per year had 
gone down from around 7,000,000 in the pre-militancy days to a few thousands in the 
following years. It is estimated that the state lost 27 million tourists from 1989–2002 
150 Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir, 112‒14. 
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leading to tourism revenue loss of $3.6 billion.”153 Tourism was one of the main sources 
of state economy as it provided employment opportunities for Kashmiri people and 
revenue for the state; thus, its reduction was a great loss for the Kashmiri economy.  
d. Analysis of the First Phase COIN 
In the 1990s, the Indian COIN strategy largely favored a military solution over the 
political resolution of the insurgency and socio-economic development in the region. The 
military’s initial success in preventing insurgents from launching state-wide large-scale 
guerrilla warfare and limiting only to terror acts during the 1990s was notable; the Indian 
COIN campaign as a whole, however, seemed ineffective in winning popular support, 
respecting human rights, and continuing economic development. Initially, the Indian 
COIN approach against Kashmiri separatist insurgents was criticized as, “repression and 
reprisal targeted not just against armed militants but frequently also against disloyal 
civilian communities that aided and sheltered the rebels.”154 As a result, the insurgency 
rapidly intensified and the neutral population stopped supporting the government. The 
cases of human rights abuse by the security forces also made a huge gap in the state and 
damaged the civil-military relations. Protecting human rights and preventing the 
population from supporting insurgents proved to be most challenging for the Indian 
COIN campaign in Kashmir.  
The continuous Pakistani support to insurgents, including foreign jihadi fighters, 
and their religious fervor also worsened the situation in Kashmir. The Indian government 
could not initiate any political process to listen to and address the people’s legitimate 
grievances through extensive participatory elections. As a result, the public continued to 
confront the security forces, rejected the elections of 1996 and beyond, and provided 
support to the insurgency. Although the security forces were relatively successful in 
controlling insurgents, this singular area-focused military approach did not contribute to 
153 Rajni Sharma, Vinod Kumar Sharma and Var Inder Singh Waris, “Impact of Peace and 
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the overall improvement of the situation in Kashmir, such as the political process and 
socio-economic programs. Such programs are very essential for the state and security 
forces in addressing the people’s concerns with a view to winning popular support. At 
this stage, Nepal also used a similar repressive strategy to counter the Maoist threat 
continuously, which pushed the neutral population over to the insurgents’ side. The next 
chapter will explain this in detail.  
2. Phase II (From 2000 to the Present) 
a. Security Operations  
From the late 1990s, India actively started to employ the Indian army in a large-
scale WHAM campaign, Operation Sadbhavna, which was aimed solely at winning the 
support of the Kashmiri people and providing security from terrorist threats through 
effective security operations and socio-economic development. These efforts included the 
improvement of living conditions and educational standards of the locals by establishing 
schools, computer learning centers, and vocational training centers; funding scholarship 
programs for brilliant and economically disadvantaged students; organizing health camps 
and medical treatment centers in remote areas; constructing and repairing bridges and 
damaged houses; assisting farmers by providing pumps for irrigation; provisioning 
drinking water; adopting orphaned children; providing veterinary coverage for farm 
livestock; offering assistance in the provision of radios, television sets, and computers; 
and organizing educational tours for college and university students to other parts of 
India, etc.155 With this wide participation in public affairs, the visible change in the 
attitude of people towards the security forces and the governmental projects emerged in 
Kashmir after 2006–2007, as stated by Anant.156 Operation Sadbhavna projected a 
people-friendly approach and proved to be one of the effective tools to gradually change 
the resentful attitude of the people toward the security forces and the government. To 
some extent, this process also contributed to isolating armed elements from the 
155 Anant, “COIN and Op Sadbhavana,” 16‒20. 
156 Ibid., 6. 
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population base, which helped the government to conduct all due elections from the local 
to state level.  
Since the Unified Headquarters (UHQ) became operational in the late 1990s, 
operations of the Army, police, and the paramilitary forces have been coordinated. The 
unified command and control system was initiated in 1993, but became fully functional in 
1999 after the Kargil War. In order to exercise effective command and control and 
monitor routine updates of the security situation, the Chief Minister chairs the meetings 
of the UHQ with senior representatives of the state government, army, central armed 
police forces, and other security agencies.157 Besides the monitoring function, the UHQ 
started being more effective in operational mobilization. It helped greatly to coordinate 
and control the security forces’ small- and large-scale offensive operations, minimize the 
collateral damage, and provide humanitarian support to the needy population. This 
largely enhanced the surveillance of the LOC and targeting capability, which proved to 
be effective in monitoring and countering militants’ infiltration and exfiltration along the 
LOC.  
The massive Indian military operational deployment after the 2001 suicide attack 
on the Indian Parliament followed by another suicide attack targeting the families of 
soldiers dramatically altered the security situation in Kashmir. In response to these 
attacks, India mobilized massive military concentrations along the LOC in Operation 
Parakram. Immediately, Pakistan also reacted with its military deployment and 
maintained the combat readiness posture. This was South Asia’s largest-ever militarized 
standoff along the LOC throughout 2002, indicating that war was probable at any 
time.158 Along with the force deployment, “India also focused on fencing the entire 470 
miles of the LOC, and deploying surveillance radars, ground sensors, thermal imaging 
devices, night vision devices, and early warning detectors to form the coordinated 
surveillance system, which superimposed the already developed COIN grid system,” as 
157 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 2012‒2013, 6, accessed August 
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Sahukar claims.159 These physical improvements appeared to be a strong obstacle for 
Pakistan-based terrorists in continuing their infiltration and support to the Kashmiri 
insurgency. Also, the mass military concentration and maintenance of the operational 
readiness posture along the LOC demonstrated the Indian willingness to launch 
immediate limited incursion anytime into Pakistani territory, if terrorists backed by 
Pakistan continued attacks on Indian interests anywhere in India.  
Indian security forces formulated a COIN doctrine, organized special and joint 
training, and modernized the police forces during the early 2000s. The Indian army 
doctrine of 2004 was replaced by the doctrine for the sub-conventional operations in 
2006. With this change, the Indian security forces started following the doctrinal pattern 
of people-centric operations along with effective security operations, which emphasized 
the minimum use of force, enhancement of civil-military relations, and implementing a 
campaign of winning the hearts and minds of the people.160 Subsequently, theater and 
Corps battle schools were also set up in Kashmir, which were aimed at providing pre-
induction training to units coming from the conventional to an insurgency role.161 The 
counterinsurgency and jungle warfare school in Mizoram also started to conduct special 
training, which stressed that winning popular support and respecting human rights in 
COIN operations is crucial to winning the fight. In an attempt to foster cooperation and 
share experiences with other countries, India organized joint COIN exercises with the 
U.S., Russia, China, and many other countries.162 Side by side, India also started to 
modernize, expand, train, and re-equip the local police, central reserve police force, 
border security force, and Rashtriya Rifles with the latest weapons and equipment. This 
effort improved the inter-operability among various types of security agencies deployed 
to deal with the insurgency in Kashmir.163  
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These wide-ranging changes in the pattern of the Indian security operations in 
Kashmir, as noted, helped gradually to limit the terrorist violence throughout the 2000s 
and brought fatalities to a new and dramatic low, with just 183 killed in 2011. As claimed 
by Kapur, after the crisis in 2002, when India adopted the doctrine of Cold Start, the 
deployment of the massive force along the border, “terrorist-related incidents fell by 22 
percent from 2004 to 2005 with civilian deaths falling 21 percent and security personnel 
deaths falling 33 percent. In 2006, terrorist incidents declined an additional 16 percent, 
killing 30 percent fewer civilian and 20 percent fewer security forces than the previous 
years. Estimated instances of militant infiltration into Indian territory from Pakistan 
declined only 4 percent from 2005.”164 These trends showed the distinct improvement in 
the security situation in Kashmir. The year 2010 had been considered as the most 
peaceful year in over two decades of insurgency in the state, with only 375 terrorism-
related fatalities.165 In October 2012, as Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde 
states, “There is marked improvement in the security situation in the State (J&K).”166  
Similarly, Lt. Gen. G.K. Sinha, the governor of Kashmir, states, “In 2007, the 
reduction of casualties has been brought down by 55 percent from 2006, and the strength 
of the insurgents has been reduced to about 1800 from 3400 in the past few years.”167 
The leadership of the insurgent groups has also been hit hard by successful security 
forces operations.168 This is reinforced by the Indian government’s annual report for 
2012–2013, which says there was a noticeable decline in the number of terrorist incidents 
and casualties of civilians and security forces personnel compared to previous years.169 
The incidents of terrorist violence declined from “499 in 2009 to 488 in 2010 and 340 in 
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165 South Asia Terrorist Portal Database, “Jammu and Kashmir Assessment - Year 2012” accessed 
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2011 to 192 in 2012.”170 The year 2012 witnessed a “35.29 percent decrease in the 
number of terrorist incidents and 54.54 percent and 51.61 percent decrease in civilians 
and Security Forces (SFs) fatalities respectively as compared to the year 2011.”171 
Seventy-two terrorists were also neutralized during 2012, and the valley seemed 
comparatively free of major law and order problems, including civil disturbances during 
the year.172  
In addition to the planned and coordinated Indian COIN operations, the Pakistani 
involvement in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and counterinsurgency operations 
within Pakistan also made a difference in the insurgency movement in Kashmir. After 
September 11, 2001, Pakistan along with U.S.-led coalition forces began fighting against 
the Taliban, which they had previously used to fight the former USSR forces in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s. The change in its stand, after decades of using the mujahidin as 
a national tool against former Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and Indian- controlled 
Kashmir, generated immense unease and distrust between the state and some of these 
terrorist groups operating in and from Pakistan to Afghanistan and Kashmir.173 Some of 
these terrorist groups were also involved in sectarian and jihadi movements in Pakistan, 
which were now becoming the most serious security challenges for Pakistani internal 
security.174  
The deployment of the Pakistani military to deal with the insurgencies in 
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered 
Tribal Areas (PATA) that include Swat and six neighboring districts and areas in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK) also diverted their interest from supporting the terrorists’ 
infiltration into Kashmir.175 The Pakistani army and paramilitary forces (the Frontier 
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Corps) were unable to regain control of the situation in Swat Valley and Waziristan in the 
initial phase of the operations in the 2000s.176 As a result, the Pakistani military sustained 
significant losses and faced challenges in maintaining security in some tribal areas.177 
Also, these COIN operations led to the displacement of over two million people 
elsewhere in Pakistan.178 Apart from the radical threat in the tribal areas along the porous 
Durand line with Afghanistan, continuing violence in other parts of the country and the 
internal problem in Baluchistan also demanded extended military operations. Therefore, 
the overstretched engagement of the Pakistani military and ISI in various sectors made 
them less likely to continue extensive support for the Kashmiri insurgency as they had in 
the 1990s. As various security experts argue, Pakistan also realized that the seriousness of 
the insurgent threat to its internal security was very difficult to manage, and the 
involvement in supporting the insurgency against its neighbor could be counterproductive 
for the country.179  
b. Political Process 
In the past decade, India reinitiated the political process by successfully holding 
state and local elections, which are held regularly when due. According to the Indian 
Home Ministry’s Annual Reports of 2002 through 2009, “even though over 800 people 
were killed by terrorists in the Kashmir State Assembly elections of 2002, an average of 
over 43 percent voter turnout in three phases of the elections in Kashmir was 
recorded.”180 There was an average of “48 percent voter turnout in 63-urban-civic-body 
elections in 2005. In 2006 by-elections to the state legislature, over 70 percent voted. In 
the insurgency affected areas of Srinagar, over 80 percent of the registered voters cast 
their vote.”181 In the 2008 state assembly election, “participation in the Assembly 
176 Ibid.  
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Elections raised 63 percent of registered voters. The 2011 Panchayet (village local self-
government institutions) elections recorded a 79 percent voter turnout.”182 People’s 
turnout in the electoral process indicated that the Indian COIN effort had led to an 
increased level of popular participation in the government’s political process in Kashmir. 
The elected political bodies of the state could now initiate a process to listen to and 
address the local people’s grievances.  
The Bharatiye Janata Party (BJP)-led national coalition government with the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) from 1998 to 2004 saw the initiation of the 
democratic political culture in Kashmir. Although most observers expected that the BJP-
led government would take a hardline approach against the Muslim separatist insurgency 
in Kashmir, the government was the first non-Congress government in the center that 
started working closely with the NC party, which had remained central to the politics of 
Kashmir since the partition. With the long history of political manipulation and 
mismanagement of election results, Congress’s close ally, the NC, not only enjoyed the 
power and popularity, but also gradually eroded its legitimacy and created a political 
vacuum in Kashmir.183 
As Chowdhary and Rao argue, the decision of the NC to join sides with the BJP-
led coalition in 1999 harmed the NC’s politics in Kashmir because the impression of BJP 
among Kashmiris, with regard to the enactment of the Prevention of the Terrorist Act and 
the Gujarat violence, was not positive. This step became the major source of 
embarrassment to the image of the party, which subsequently helped other opposition 
political parties to raise the issues and gain their positions in Kashmiri politics. In the 
election of 2002, the NC downgraded itself from a hegemonic actor to the opposition 
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party in Kashmiri politics for the first time, which initiated the culture of competitive 
politics in Kashmir.184  
The Indian government of the BJP-NDA alliance also initiated talks with several 
political parties in Kashmir with the support of the state government. Later, they were 
allowed to visit Pakistan for talks with Pakistani officials.185 At the same time, the center 
offered direct talks with separatist groups in Kashmir if they would agree to give up 
violence. Two round-table meetings were held with various groups in 2002 and 2003, 
though no real breakthrough was achieved.186 Both India and Pakistan also initiated 
several notable peace initiatives and confidence-building measures, such as the Lahore 
Declaration and the exchange of visits of high delegations to bring down the level of 
mistrust between them. As a result, they agreed to establish the ceasefire agreement of 
2003 after a massive military standoff along the LOC, which is still continuing.187  
A regional forum, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) summit of 2004 also helped, to some extent, to create an environment for 
bilateral dilogue between India and Pakistan.188 As Khan argues, during this SAARC 
summit, “the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers met privately and agreed to form a 
peace process to encompass all issues affecting relations between the two neighbors.”189 
After the summit, Pakistan and India finally agreed to pursue a dialogue on the Kashmir 
issue, by setting a timetable for future dialogues. Following this, in April 2005 the 
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was started, which re-united many families on either 
side of the LOC and encouraged people-to-people contact across the LOC.190 In 2006, 
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India and Pakistan set up a joint Anti-terror Mechanism.191 Bilateral diplomatic 
initiatives are ongoing at the state and national levels even after the terrorist attack on the 
Indian Parliament in 2008, but not as extensively as in previous years.  
In addition to the Indian-Pakistani bilateral diplomatic engagement on the 
Kashmir issue, the U.S. declaration of the GWOT in Afghanistan against Al Qaida after 
September 2001 also brought diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the 
insurgent movements in Kashmir. Pakistan, by virtue of its geographic position and 
certain choices made by its leadership, became a frontline state in the GWOT. The U.S. 
also considered Pakistan as one of its very important non-NATO partners to fight the 
GWOT. This U.S.-Pakistani partnership forced the Pakistani leadership to ban the 
terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan. As a result, ISI closed its training camps in 
Afghanistan and then closed some of its Kashmir offices as well.192 Besides restrictions 
on Pakistan-based terrorists, Pakistan also directed a wave of highly publicized arrests of 
many militant organizations, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed 
(JeM).193 This process could not be continued.  
India blamed Pakistan for not being able to punish most of the arrested terrorists 
and releasing them shortly after their arrest. Subsequently, this blame turned out to be 
true when the banned terrorists quickly reorganized under different names and continued 
their activities freely within Pakistan and across the LOC. The Pakistani state stance 
against terrorist organizations, however, for the first time decreased cross-border 
infiltration, which was observed during 2002,194 and this also brought India and Pakistan 
diplomatically closer than before, which later helped to initiate various confidence-
building measures between them.  
191 Wagenen, “An Analysis of the Indian COIN,” 10‒11. 




                                                 
c. Socio-Economic Programs  
After 2000, the central government of India continuously supported the state 
government in its efforts to bring about all-round long-term planning for economic 
development and to provide avenues for gainful employment of the people. In the last 
decade, “Indian governments planned for 67 Projects for Kashmir. Out of these projects, 
33 projects were completed, and the remaining 34 projects are at various stages of 
implementation.”195 According to Sahukar, “the central government announced the 
reconstruction plan for Kashmir involving an outlay of approximately $5.3bn in 2004 to 
expand the economic infrastructure, such as power generation, construction of roads, 
education, health, tourism, agriculture, and basic services.”196 In addition, $1.3bn has 
been earmarked to extend the existing railway network from Jammu to Srinagar in the 
Kashmir Valley.197 As stated by the annual report of the Ministry of Home Affairs, India, 
“the Indian government released Indian currency 32,009 Crore in 2013 for further 
economic developments in Kashmir.”198 With these center-funded programs, the elected 
state legislatures now have the power to prioritize programs, such as building roads, 
schools, and health centers, and creating jobs; it is very difficult, however, to manage in a 
short time the immense suffering of the population from the conflict over two decades.  
During the 2000s, the gradually improved security scenario also resulted in 
dramatic increases in the arrival of tourists, from an estimated over “500,000 in 2001, 
over 800,000 in 2005 and to over 900,000 in 2010, one million in 2011 and 1.5 million in 
2012, which indicates the increasing arrivals, approximately 50 percent after 2000.”199 
Significantly, on November 6, 2012, “the United Kingdom’s High Commissioner to New 
Delhi, Sir James Bevan, lifting UK’s nearly two-decade-old advisory to its nationals to 
avoid traveling to Srinagar, Jammu and Ladakh, in a letter to Chief Minister Omar 
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Abdullah, observed: “The improvement in the security situation has led us (the UK) to 
lift the advisory against UK citizens travelling to both the cities of Jammu and Srinagar 
and travel to these two cities on the Jammu-Srinagar highway.”200 As stated by the SATP 
database, the Jammu and Kashmir tourism sector accounts for 5.92 percent of India’s 
GDP.201 Therefore, the returning tourism in Kashmir is important for the state economy 
as it provides employment opportunities for locals and revenue for the state, which now 
has increased.  
d. Analysis of the Second Phase COIN 
In this phase, India changed its COIN approach from solely a military response to 
a more integrated way in dealing with the insurgency. This COIN response was a 
combination of the political process to address the people’s grievances through the 
routine conduct of local and state elections to form their own government; the diplomatic 
process to initiate negotiation within and outside the country; socio-economic programs 
to create employment opportunities, collect revenue for the state, and prioritize and 
initiate the long-term development programs; effective security operations based on the 
doctrinal pattern to win the hearts and minds of the people and defeat insurgent fighters 
in Kashmir; and massive military deployment along the LOC to deter Pakistan and block 
infiltration and exfiltration through the LOC. As a result, the gradually declining trend of 
insurgent violence, increasing popular participation in the political process, improving 
economic growth, and returning tourism have been witnessed in Kashmir since 2000.202  
Meanwhile, the over-extended deployment of Pakistani military and ISI in COIN 
operations within Pakistan and the policy to fight the GWOT along with Western powers 
in recent decades, to some extent, diverted their focus and interest from the Kashmiri 
front. This has also created immense unease and distrust between the Pakistani state and 
extremist Islamic terrorist groups. Due to these factors, there is a declining terrorist influx 
into Kashmir as compared to the decade of the 1990s. In this phase, the regional 




                                                 
cooperation, bilateral diplomatic engagement, and U.S. diplomatic pressure on Pakistani 
leadership also brought India and Pakistan diplomatically closer, which led to the 
initiation of some important steps with a view to soothing the crisis over Kashmir as well 
as renouncing insurgent violence in Kashmir. In the Nepalese case, the government failed 
to address legitimate grievances of the people by mobilizing all available national means, 
and it solely focused on the military solution over the insurgency. The government 
deployed the Nepal army (NA) in addition to the police and armed police force from 
2001 to 2006. At this stage, the security forces could not decisively defeat the Maoist 
insurgency, but achieved some degree of tactical success. This will be explained in detail 
in the next chapter.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Kashmiri Muslims started an armed struggle for independence from India, which 
began in the late 1980s. This has become one of the most serious and complex internal 
security problems for India. The insurgency is still ongoing in Kashmir. The origin of this 
insurgency is linked with a history of the denial of democratic rights and institutions to 
the Kashmiri people. This situation may be attributed to a combination of New Delhi’s 
centralized political control and mismanagement of political institutions, the state 
government’s incompetent handling of the domestic situation and highly corrupt 
administration, and the increased level of awareness among Kashmiri youth from 
exposure to higher education and mass media. These factors helped the frustration and 
dissatisfaction of the Kashmiri people to emerge, which ultimately led to the armed 
movement.  
Besides the local Kashmiri insurgents, the jihadi fighters from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and other countries from the Middle East by way of Pakistan have participated 
in the insurgency in Kashmir since the 1990s, a unique aspect of this insurgency. This 
insurgency continued to evolve primarily with Pakistani support, the lifeline for the 
insurgents in Kashmir, as Pakistan perceives Kashmir as the unfinished agenda of the 
partition. The insurgents received arms, equipment, funds, training, and moral support 
from Pakistan. Therefore, the Kashmir insurgency is complex and deep-rooted, and it 
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shares conflicting interests of multiple players, such as India, Pakistan, and Kashmiri 
Muslims.  
The Indian COIN approach has been developed over decades of its experience in 
fighting insurgency and terrorism based on various demands. The Indian COIN in 
Kashmir is one of these efforts, which has been fought against the Kashmiri Muslim 
separatist insurgents. It has experienced both failure and success at various junctures. In 
1990, India mobilized the Indian army, paramilitary, and police force to fight the 
insurgency and began to rely on them to control the security setting for the following 
decades. The Indian COIN strategy in Kashmir in the 1990s largely favored a military 
solution over the political resolution of the insurgency as the security situation in 
Kashmir was completely out of control in the late 1980s. At that time, the Indian army 
not only had to deal with the separatist insurgents within Kashmir, but also to deter 
terrorists’ infiltration as well as the Pakistani army and its active support of insurgents. 
Because of the deteriorated security situation and all-out support from Pakistan to the 
insurgents, India was not able to initiate an effective political and diplomatic process and 
socio-economic program in the1990s.  
Although Indian security forces achieved initial success in defeating the 
insurgents’ attempt to transition into state-wide large-scale guerrilla warfare, and in 
limiting them to terror acts as the only mean to gain internal and external support, the 
Indian government appeared ineffective in winning popular support, respecting human 
rights, continuing socio-economic development, and initiating political and diplomatic 
processes in the 1990s. The public continuously confronted the security forces, rejected 
the elections of 1996 and beyond, and provided support to the insurgency. Due to these 
setbacks, India reached the point where it had to change the COIN strategy to win the 
people’s support for the COIN efforts and deter Pakistan from supporting terrorists by 
continuing massive military deployment—Operation Parakram—and launching a people-
oriented campaign—Operation Sadbhavana—along with political and diplomatic 
processes, and socio-economic development programs.  
From the late 1990s, the Indian COIN strategy has shifted from an aggressive 
military response to a mixed approach that has included massive military deployment 
 55 
along with other security forces operations, a political process to address the people’s 
legitimate grievances, and a program for socio-economic development. This change in 
the COIN strategy has led to increased levels of COIN success in Kashmir. First, there is 
progressively increasing voter turnout in all elections after 2002. Now, the political 
institutions, from local to state levels, elected by the Kashmiri people are in place and 
functional. Their representatives are in a position to listen and address their grievances. 
The Indian and the state government are engaged in negotiations with the parties 
concerned. The recent elections for the Kashmiri state legislature, however,  play only a 
small role in prompting change, particularly in terms of the demilitarization of the state 
and addressing grievances because of continued violence in Kashmir and Pakistan’s 
proxy war strategy.  
Second, the dramatic increases in the arrival of tourists, improvements in 
economic growth, and the center’s long-term and short-term investment in various 
employment projects and development programs are positive indications of socio-
economic development in Kashmir. The state legislatures now have the power to 
prioritize programs and carry out important construction, such as building roads, schools, 
and health centers and creating jobs. The immense suffering of a population from over 
two decades of fighting, however, cannot be treated in a short period of time with the 
limited availability of funds and resources. To support the Kashmiri economy, the central 
government must release more funds than it does to other states, and it must also become 
involved in more long-term state development projects.   
Third, the distinct signs of improvement in the internal security situation with the 
steep and continuous decline in trends of violent activities and the presence of insurgents, 
infiltration of terrorists across the LOC, displacement of other religious groups, and the 
overall casualty rate have been observed in Kashmir since the 2000s. The security 
operations have also provided the suitable environment to conduct local and state 
elections, expand the economic development programs from the center to local levels, 
and increase the tourist flow. These efforts overall have shown progress in winning the 
hearts and minds of the people and in reducing the insurgent threats as compared to the 
COIN efforts of the 1990s.  
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Currents events are demonstrating that India understands the need for the mixed 
approach to control and gradually improve the overall situation in Kashmir. Moreover, 
due to U.S. diplomatic pressure, Pakistan has changed its strategy from supporting 
terrorist groups to outlawing them, which has played, to some extent, a positive role in 
Kashmir in recent years. Pakistan’s focus, which has shifted from the Kashmir front to 
the Afghani border and other insurgency affected areas, also demanded more military and 
ISI presence in these areas, and this also has created the distrust between the state and 
some of the terrorist organizations operating there. These developments have helped to 
divert their interests from Kashmiri insurgency to other sectors within Pakistan.  
After explaining and analyzing the level of achievement of the Indian COIN 
approaches in Kashmir during the period from 1989 to 2000 and the period from 2001 to 
2012, the mixed COIN approach in the later phase led to recent success in Kashmir. 
Therefore, the mixed COIN approach offers promise in dealing with the complex 
insurgency in the economically developing democratic setting of Indian Kashmir, which 
is linked with territorial dispute, extensive ethnic mobilization, and active external 
support. If India solely used an economic development and political approach, it would 
likely be ineffective because security and the political process with development are 
inseparably connected with each other. For example, India was able to resume its 
legitimate political and economic processes only after the effective security response to 
the insurgency since 2000. The socio-politico-economic institutions in Kashmir in the 
early 1990s had become completely ineffective at keeping the insurgency under control. 
After mobilization of its military, India achieved initial success in controlling the 
insurgents’ attempt to transition into state-wide large-scale guerrilla warfare and in 
limiting them to terror acts. Thus, the military aspect of the mixed approach is also 
necessary to control or defeat armed elements of the insurgency, or force them to the 
negotiating table.  
On the other hand, as we will see in the next chapter, the Nepalese government 
used the enemy-centric approach throughout the campaign from 1996 to 2006, which was 
directed at eliminating the insurgency. It did not attempt to address the genuine demands 
of the people and win their support for the state’s initiative. Unlike the COIN campaign 
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in Kashmir, the Nepalese COIN campaign was unsuccessful in establishing the 
government’s legitimacy and effectiveness, controlling the state’s political, economic, 
and social institutions, and gaining popular support. Instead, the insurgents, through a 
nationwide mass movement, achieved a safe landing and gained the upper hand in 
political negotiations with opposition political parties under Indian mediation and 
overthrew the existing government in 2006.  
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III. MAOIST INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 
CAMPAIGN IN NEPAL 
In order to understand the Maoist insurgency and the success and failure of the 
Nepalese COIN campaign, it is essential to understand the core issues that led to the 
insurgency’s birth, growth, and end, and to the failure of the government’s COIN efforts 
from 1996 to 2006. The violent insurgency of the Unified Communist party of Nepal 
(Maoists)203 (hereafter referred to as the Maoists) began formally with the declaration of 
the People’s War on February 13, 1996. The Maoist insurgency is considered one of the 
most radical movements that Nepal has ever faced in its nearly two-and-a-half centuries 
of existence. This insurgency matured and fought against a transitional democratic 
government in Nepal from 1996 to 2006. In the initial stage, the Maoists started by 
attacking small police posts and landlords in remote and less-developed districts of 
western Nepal. Subsequently, the group expanded its movement all over the country and 
into almost every sectors of Nepalese life. The ten years of campaigning claimed over 
14,000 lives, destroyed billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure, and displaced tens of 
thousands of people.204 
During the initial stage of the insurgency, the government adopted a law and order 
approach to address the problem with heavy-handed police response, which proved to be 
counterproductive.205 This was followed by deployment of the Nepalese army (then the 
Royal Nepal Army, RNA), whose efforts resulted in tactical effect rather than the 
strategic upper hand. During ten years of fighting, the Maoists carefully used both 
political and military means and ultimately decided to end the insurgency with the 
negotiated political settlement (comprehensive peace agreement) between the Maoists 
203 The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was previously named ‘the communist party of 
Nepal (Maoist)’ until this party formally unified with other small communist parties in January 2009. Then, 
it changed its name to the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). 
204 Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty 
First Century (New York: Routledge, 2010), 310. 
205 Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), Human Rights Yearbook 1999 (Kathmandu: INSEC, 
2000), 20.  
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and the government of Nepal in 2006. This agreement brought the major demands of the 
Maoists on board, such as abolishment of the centuries-old monarchy and an election to 
the constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.  
In this chapter, I will illustrate how the Maoist insurgency flourished in the 
economically and politically weak transitional democratic setting of Nepal based on the 
extensive mobilization of socio-economically marginalized and politically excluded 
lower castes, Dalits (Untouchable or oppressed castes), women, and ethnic groups. The 
Maoists’ strategy balanced both the people’s support and armed struggle in keeping their 
political options open. The main focus of this chapter will be on the Nepalese COIN 
strategy from 1996 to 2006. By doing so, this thesis emphasizes that the COIN strategy 
requires not only the enemy-centric approach, which can be counterproductive, but also 
more than this to achieve success. In this chapter, I will attempt to show that an 
overemphasized military response was the predominant component of the Nepalese 
COIN approach, which contributed to the failure of the then king-led government under 
the democratic constitution of 1990. This is unlike the situation in Kashmir in the later 
phase of the campaign, when India used the integrated approach and achieved some level 
of success in Kashmir (as explained in the previous chapter). More extensive comparison 
will be provided in the following chapter. In this chapter, I will compare the Nepalese 
COIN approach in different phases of the Maoist insurgency to some elements of COIN 
theories and the approach taken in Kashmir, which outlines some essential prerequisites 
for the success of the campaign. These elements included effective security operations to 
defeat the armed elements of insurgency, adherence to political methods of addressing 
the people’s grievances, and overall socio-economic development in an insurgency-
affected region. An analysis of these aspects will identify whether the Nepalese enemy-
centric COIN approach led to the failure of the government’s COIN campaign in Nepal. 
This chapter discussion will also consider how these countermeasures compare to those 
used in Kashmir.  
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A. BACKGROUND OF THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL 
The Maoist insurgency endured in Nepal for more than a decade and posed a 
challenging threat to national security from 1996 to 2006. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the Maoist insurgency, it is essential to begin with the history of the 
communist movement in Nepal, which allows us to understand the birth and growth of 
the radical elements that became the Maoists group later. This radical Maoist strategy 
always believed in armed rebellion to seize state power, but its ambitions were contained 
in the past. Second, it is equally important to know that the rise of the Maoist insurgency 
in Nepal in the 1990s was a continuation of the communist movement of Nepal, which 
emerged in 1949. This movement became increasingly successful in the twenty-first 
century after the demise of the Soviet regime and the acceptance of the Chinese regime 
toward economic liberalization. Last, it is also essential to understand the causes of the 
Maoist insurgency that gave them a solid foundation to organize, fight, and search for a 
peaceful settlement.  
1. Communist Movement in Nepal (From 1949 to 1990) 
The foundation of the communist movement in Nepal goes back to 1949, when 
Puspa Lal Shrestha and his four associates formed the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) 
in Calcutta, India.206 In the 1950s, the party solely focused on radical land reforms, the 
abrogation of the 1950 Treaty with India, and opposition to the United States. The CPN 
faced failure while campaigning for election based on this political agenda; it secured 
only four seats out of 109 in the first-ever parliamentary election conducted in 1959.207 
In 1960, the CPN suffered an ideological split along Chinese-Soviet lines when there was 
a question raised on the issue of supporting a royal takeover in December 1960. As a 
result, the pro-Russian faction led by Keshar Jung Rayamajhi declared support for King 
206 Dipak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 
2003 (Kathmandu, Nepal: The Printhouse, 2003), 20. 
207 Avidit Acharya, “The Moist Insurgency in Nepal and the Political Economy of Violence,” 
Working Papers Series (May 11, 2010), 5, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 
Princeton University, accessed November 25, 2013, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1603750. 
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Mahendra’s coup while the pro-Chinese faction led by Puspa Lal opposed the royal coup 
and remained relatively quiet in politics until the 1970s.208 During the 1960s and 1970s, 
the communist movement in Nepal also developed radical factions that were influenced 
by Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China and the Naxalites movement of India. In Nepal, 
there is a long history of splitting of the communists when some ideological or contextual 
differences or better opportunities arise. According to Thapa, there are more than a dozen 
splits in the Communist Party of Nepal, since its establishment in 1949.209 
Following the Chinese line, a young communist party leader, Mohan Bikram 
Singh, concentrated his efforts on establishing a base for left-wing activists in the remote 
mid-western hill districts of Rolpa, Rukum, and Pyuthan. Later, Singh became the 
general secretary and, according to Thapa and Sijapati, “proposed training guerrillas, 
proletarianising party cadre, creating separate base areas, taking actions against local 
cheats, and initiating an agrarian uprising.”210 His proposal was adopted by the party 
without any change. (Later, the same course was adopted by the Maoists in the mid-
1990s.) According to Acharya, “Singh’s strategy was to take advantage of local 
grievances, particularly the decline in living standards, which the inhabitants of these 
districts reportedly ascribed to the government’s suppression of Hashish production in the 
1970s.”211 Due to this close association with rural villagers, Singh successfully won 700 
out of 703 votes in the Thawang village of Rolpa against the king-led Panchayet system 
in the referendum of 1980. (Later, the Maoists also used this village as their first base.) 
But, Singh’s 1989 campaign came to an end with the result of the referendum being in 
favor of the king’s party-less system.212  
208 Ibid. 
209 Manish Thapa, “Evolution of Maoism in Nepal: Understanding the Maoist Insurgency from Wider 
Perspective,” Panorama, Global On line Publication, accessed November 27, 2013, 
http://www.tigweb.org/youth-media/panorama/article.html?ContentID=6491&start=5656. 
210 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 25. 
211 Acharya, “The Moist Insurgency in Nepal,” 5. 
212 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 25. 
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After the referendum and victory of the party-less Panchayet system in 1980, a 
second and third split occurred due to the pro-China CPN faction. This was caused by 
disagreements between radicals and moderates on whether the party should participate in 
the election under the king’s party-less system.213 Nirmal Lama was in favor of taking 
part in Panchayeti elections, whereas Mohan Bikram Singh preferred boycotting the 
election. As a result, the CPN’s fourth convention broke up into Lama and Singh factions 
in 1983. Singh set up his party under the name of CPN (Masal), which became one of the 
founding organizations of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM).214 
Another split happened in 1985 after the fifth convention, leading to Singh’s CPN 
(Masal) and Mohan Baidya’s CPN (Mashal). Baidya’s Mashal adopted the doctrine of a 
violent movement to instigate a mass uprising against the state. (Later, the Maoists 
adopted this as their core strategy, and Baidya remained as one of the top leaders of the 
CPN-Maoist).215 
Second, following in the footsteps of the Naxalites movement of India, the CPN 
(Marxist-Leninist) carried out killings of local land owners in the eastern Jhapa district of 
Nepal during the early 1970s, also known as the Jhapa Uprising.216 Although this 
uprising was limited to a single district, it was the first armed communist rebellion in the 
history of Nepal. This uprising was immediately suppressed by the then Panchayet 
government, a party-less system under direct rule of the monarch.217  
2. Rise of the Maoist Movement in Nepal (From 1990 to 2006) 
The Nepalese communists could be generally categorized into two groups until 
the end of the Panchayet system. One group was ready to follow a democratic system and 
the other believed in seizure of power through armed insurgency. In the late-1980s, the 
Democratic Party, the Nepali Congress (NC), and the leftist coalition (seven small 
213 Acharya, “The Moist Insurgency in Nepal,” 5. 
214 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 25. 
215 Ibid., 26‒27. 
216 Ibid., 26. 
217 Ibid. 
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communist parties, which descended from the original CPN) jointly organized the 
people’s democratic mass movement to overthrow the absolute monarchy. After 
restoration of the democracy in 1990, the leftist coalition ran under the banner of the CPN 
(UML-United Marxist-Leninist) and emerged as the second-largest party from the 
general election of 1991, when NC became the largest party.218 After the restoration of 
the democracy, the Unity Center (UC) led by Prachanda, the top Maoist leader and later 
Prime Minister re-united the cadres of radical groups again to form a subversive 
revolutionary organization. Meanwhile, Nirmal Lama and Baburam Bhattarai organized 
the United People’s Front (UPF) as an open political wing, which was formerly a Singh-
led Masal faction that participated in the general election. The UC (later the Maoists) 
took part in the first democratic elections under the umbrella of the UPF and won nine 
seats in the representative assembly.219  
The mid-term parliamentary elections of November 1994 resulted in a hung 
parliament that further led to a power-centric rivalry among major political parties. Thus, 
they were pre-occupied with their own political survival rather than addressing the 
people’s needs. According to Thapa, “The Maoists seemed betrayed by the failed promise 
of democracy, and felt powerless even though they were hardly a fringe political party 
represented in the national parliament.”220 In 1994, the Maoists under the UPF 
abandoned their legislative seats and their leaders went underground. The split in the UC 
in 1994 gave a birth to the Prachanda-led Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) that 
adopted a plan for a people’s war.221 It started its propaganda and armed actions in the 
least developed and remote districts of Rolpa in mid-western Nepal. The rest of the UC, 
who were still supporting the parliamentary election, remained under the leadership of 
Nirmal Lama.222  
218 Acharya, “The Moist Insurgency in Nepal,” 6. 
219 Ibid., 6. 
220 Thapa, “Evolution of Maoism in Nepal,” 3. 
221 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 20‒27. 
222 Basu and Riaz, Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007), 126. 
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In February 1996, the leader of the UPF, Nepal, and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai 
submitted the 40-point demands to the NC-led government with an ultimatum, which was 
related to nationalism, socio-economic and political inequalities, and the people’s 
democracy. Out of 40 demands, 7 were related to nationalism, 13 to politics, 13 to socio-
economic issues, and 7 socio-cultural issues.223 Among these demands, the Maoists 
incorporated all ten causes responsible for social discrimination and inequality that had 
already been identified by the Informal Sector Service Center.224 The demands also 
encompassed the issue of declaring Nepal a secular state and some utopian ideals, such as 
employment for all.225 These demands outlined what the Maoists perceived as the 
political, economic, and social problems in Nepal, with desired outcomes to address each. 
But the NC-led government criticized this as a form of extremism and “Political 
Conspiracies”226 and did not respond to any of the demands. However, four days prior to 
the ultimatum, Bhattarai also joined the Prachanda-led Maoist movement. Then, in 
February 1996, they declared the People’s War, claiming that only a communist state 
could solve the country’s various problems. 
Though the Maoists who started the armed rebellion in 1996 were in favor of an 
armed insurgency since the initiation of the leftist movement, they used its political front 
only to forward the demands to the government as a formality because these demands 
could not possibly be addressed within the given time. The Maoists started the armed 
insurgency even before reaching the deadline.227 Deepak Thapa reinforces this view that 
the demands were just a distraction because the Maoists had already decided to launch an 
223 Harka Gurung, “Social Exclusion and Maoist Insurgency” (Paper presented at National Dialogue 
Conference on ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal People, Kathmandu, January 19–20, 2005), 
4.  
224 INSEC, Human Rights Year Book 2004, ed. Arjun Karki and David Sedon (Delhi: Adroit 
Publishers, 2003), 117. 
225 Poudyal, “Explaining the Success,” 63.  
226 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 72‒73. 
227 Deepak Thapa, “The Making of the Maoist Insurgency,” in Nepal in Transition: From People’s 
War to Fragile Peace, eds., Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 37‒57. 
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armed rebellion.228 Thapa provides an analysis of the government’s failure to address 
economic, political, and social issues prevailing in the country after the re-establishment 
of the democracy in 1990, which served as the favorable condition to start the rebellion. 
Despite an unfavorable international environment, the Maoists grabbed this situation as 
the right moment to wage the armed insurgency in Nepal, but this was the outcome of a 
rational and careful calculation of the need for the revolution to have radical change in 
Nepal.  
The Maoist insurgency as a whole was made up of mainly five elements. First, 
Thomas Marks recognizes the Maoists’ mass line as a counter-state parallel mechanism, 
“organizing an alternative society through the construction of clandestine infrastructure. 
Local socio-economic grievances and aspirations are too addressed by cadres, who then 
connect solutions to the political mechanism to the party.”229 This element was mainly 
focused on the Dalit and indigenous community of the mid-western region at the start. 
Second, a United Front of various individuals and groups who shared a common interest, 
but not necessarily the ultimate objective of the Maoists, provided strength to the cause. 
The third element is the armed element that operated illegally and clandestinely, which 
was very important to maintain the security of the organization and leadership from both 
inside and outside threats.230 Moreover, it was equally significant to destroy the state’s 
security organs, oppositions, and better-off people through violence. Political warfare 
was another important element of the Maoist movement. This was the decision-making 
platform focused mainly on organizing non-violent political activity and negotiation 
when and where needed. Last, international action was the outside forum for the Maoist 
cause, and which attempted to influence other nations not to support the state. These were 
the RIM and the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South 
228 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 53. 
229 Thomas A. Marks, “Insurgency in Nepal” (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, United States 
Army War College, December 2003), 6, accessed November 28, 2013, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/year.cfm?show=pubs-list&year=2003&q=121. 
230 Ibid., 6‒7.  
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Asia (CCOMPOSA), both of which share the same political ideology.231 Without 
analyzing these factors of the insurgency campaign, the Nepalese government failed to 
balance their military efforts with socio-political issues and to recognize the population as 
vital. This will be explained in detail later in this chapter. 
3. Analysis of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal 
The various theories that explain the causes of armed conflicts are generally 
diverse. Every conflict, however, has its peculiar characteristics and its own unique 
causes that are governed by its own socio-politico-economic set-up. According to various 
scholars, such as Kumar and Thapa, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal can be analyzed as 
the inevitable consequences of the country’s severe economic, political, and social 
circumstances that particularly developed after the 1990 restoration of democracy.232 
Additionally, other scholars view factors such as poverty, ethnicity, geographical 
difficulties, unemployment, lack of education, lack of natural resources, a traditional 
Hindu caste system, and social oppression as the principle causes that explain the 
insurgency in Nepal. Above all, the root causes of the people’s dissatisfaction are 
economic, socio-cultural, and political circumstances, as discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
a. Economic Inequality 
Economically, modern Nepal has been unsuccessful in development. Although 
the economic indicators (e.g., expansion of and improvements in road construction, 
banking institutions, domestic air and road connectivity, access to the educational 
establishment, mass media exposure, etc.) showed progress in the infrastructure and 
service sectors during the 1990s, Nepal remained trapped in extreme poverty as it is “one 
of the poorest countries in the world with per capita income U.S. $290 in 2006, the 
231 Timothy R.Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996–2008: Implications for U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College, Kansas, 2009), 16‒24, accessed November 28, 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA505200. 
232 Dhurba Kumar, “Proximate Causes of Conflict in Nepal,” Contributions to Nepalese Studies 32, 
no. 1 (2005): 51‒92; Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 53. 
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lowest in South Asia.”233 Lawoti claims, “Over 40 percent of medium and large 
landowners in the hills were classified as poor in 1996.”234 According to one government 
source, around 40 percent of the people were unable to access basic human needs, which 
remained unchanged between the 1970s and 1990s. Instead, the number of poor nearly 
doubled in 1996.235 
Similarly, despite the expansion in infrastructure and services, a large segment of 
the population, mainly people living in remote rural areas, continued to be ignored 
because of the increase in the population and city-based development. Only better-off 
sections and urban populations benefitted from this.236 After the change in the political 
system, there were some promising results. The gross domestic product grew by 7.9 
percent, and 4 percent of this growth came from the tourism sector alone. However, this 
growth did not continue due to political instability, bad governance, and widespread 
corruption. The growth rate started decelerating immediately.237  
In addition, challenges associated with the rugged hilly terrain, geographical 
isolation, environment, climate, and a lack of roads profoundly influenced development, 
which largely shaped opportunities in remote rural areas.238 The city and plains area-
based improvements and expansion in infrastructure and services even widened the gap 
between the rural and urban population. The geographical divide between developed 
urban and underdeveloped rural areas, and between plains and hills/mountainous areas, 
also supported the Maoist insurgency. As a result, the rebellion started in the remote, 
isolated, and underdeveloped hilly districts (Rolpa and Rukum of mid-western Nepal) 
233 Lawoti and Pahari, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 7.   
234 Ibid., 8. 
235 Ibid. 
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and Counterinsurgency (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 30–32, accessed September 19, 
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and expanded its influence and activities in 32 hilly districts immediately. Until 2000, the 
main cities and terai (southern plain) districts were considered unaffected.239   
b. Socio-Cultural Inequality 
Ethnic discrimination, the Hindu caste system, and inequality were also 
significant factors that had a direct bearing on the intensity of the conflict. On the one 
hand, the constitution of 1990 labeled Nepal as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and 
democratic state in which all citizens are equal irrespective of religion, race, gender, 
caste, tribe, or ideology.240 The statute also gave all communities the right to establish 
civil society organizations based on ethnic and caste identity to preserve and promote 
their languages, scripts, and cultures, to educate children in their mother tongues, and to 
practice their own religion.241 On the other hand, this new political system booked some 
contradictions on the issues, such as declaring Nepal as a Hindu kingdom, prohibiting 
women to pass citizenship on to their children, and preserving traditional practices. 
Minority and ethnic groups, women, and Dalits were not happy with these declarations.  
Although these constitutional arrangements were not discriminatory in spirit, 
maintaining the traditional practices of the hills-based higher caste Hindu and the Nepali 
language as a national language became quite dominant in the society, which was 
considered as the cause of great disparity between other ethnic communities and 
Madhesis (people living in the southern plains, Madhes in Nepal).242 As argued by 
Lawoti and Pahari, “Nepal not only faced class inequality, but extreme socio-cultural 
inequality also existed among numerous linguistic, ethnic, religious, racial, caste, and 
regional groups.”243 They claim that there are about sixty ethnic groups in the country 
and the presence of these groups even decreased in some institutions as compared to the 
239 Gurung, “Social Exclusion and Maoist Insurgency,” 13. 
240 Krishna B. Bhattachan, “Nepal: from Absolute Monarchy to Democracy and Back — The Need 
for Inclusive Democracy,” The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy 1, no. 4 (July 2005), accessed 
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pre-democratic era before 1990.244 The state machinery, such as bureaucracy, politics, 
military, and judiciary, is also dominated by the higher caste elites. Janajatis (lower caste 
indigenous people) and Dalits from the hills and terai were the most deprived section of 
the society and became the main attractions for the recruits of the Maoist insurgency. 
According to Thapa, Brahman (the highest caste of Hindu, the priests, scholars, and 
philosophers) and Chhetris (the second highest caste of Hindu, the kings, warriors, rulers, 
and administrators) together constitute only 29 percent of the population but they 
dominated almost all sectors before democracy and this policy of exclusion continued 
even after the change of 1990.245  
According to Lawoti, the unitary, centralized, and non-inclusive state structure 
also remained largely unchanged and unchallenged.246 With the increased level of ethnic, 
gender, and lower-caste grievances, as many commentators and scholars have identified, 
the political parties and the successive governments dominated by higher-caste elites did 
not seriously focus on representing and articulating the demands of these marginalized 
and oppressed segments of the population. The state left these groups under-represented 
at the policy making level, and with little access to power, they lacked inclusiveness in 
almost every sector of the state.247  
The denial of power and wealth had been a source of constant dissatisfaction. This 
is linked to modern values of equality and human rights as well as to basic economic 
needs of the lower-castes. With ongoing modernization of the national economy, many 
low-grade jobs of Dalits and lower-castes, particularly on farms, were replaced or 
abolished, which resulted in the lack of opportunities to earn a living.248 However, 
grievances from the agricultural sector were not limited to the lower caste and Dalits 
244 Ibid. 
245 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 20‒27. 
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only; the agricultural policy also failed to abolish the semi-feudal structure of agriculture 
in Nepal.249  
The Maoist insurgency gained momentum with extensive popular support. The 
social inequalities experienced by the lower castes, Dalits, ethnic groups, and women 
provided a fertile ground for the Maoists to organize and conduct their rebellion. 
According to the official data up to 2004, the highest casualties (32 percent) among the 
Maoists were the Janajatis and Dalits from the western hills,250 and women and Dalits 
made up 30–40 percent of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA).251 The larger 
percentage of participants was from the untouchable castes, such as Kami, Sarki, Damai, 
etc., and indigenous communities, such as Rai, Limbu, Gurung, Magar, Tamang, etc., 
who provided the Maoists with sanctuary, recruits, and other support to fight against the 
state.252 The participation of women as fighters was a completely new and unique 
phenomenon in Nepal  
c. Political Exclusion and Bad Governance 
A political grievance was another prominently identified cause of the conflict in 
Nepal. The Constitution of 1990 was drafted after the people’s democratic mass 
movement arose against the party-less Panchayet regime and established Nepal as a 
parliamentary multi-party democratic country. The change increased the blossoming 
awareness of individual rights and freedom that provided the population with 
opportunities to express their discontents and grievances. Although the history of the 
CPN dates back to 1949, one of the radical communist movements, the Maoist 
insurgency came into existence after this political change.253 While Nepal had benefited 
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politically from the third wave of democracy, the system became unable to address the 
people’s aspirations.254 
Although the form of political system changed several times in Nepalese history, 
the ordinary Nepalese people observed no positive and qualitative change in their living 
standards. Nepalese politics had been reflected as no more than a power struggle among 
major political parties.255 As a result, people continuously faced several negative 
consequences such as bad governance, increased corruption, unemployment, price 
increases in basic needs, harsh conditions of poverty, etc. Due to the corruption, budgets 
were unequally distributed and inefficiently spent, contributing to almost non-existent 
efforts at eliminating poverty and creating employment opportunities.256 A 
decentralization policy was adopted to end malfunctions of the state, but the policy was 
only manifested on paper.257  
With this new political development in the country, the Nepalese people as a 
whole had positive expectations, which were to a large extent unfulfilled.258 After 1990, 
three competitive national elections were held in the years 1991, 1994, and 1999, 
respectively. Within a period of eight years, Nepal witnessed the rise and fall of six 
coalition governments and five different prime ministers, which caused severe political 
instability in Nepal.259 The elected governments placed very little effort into expanding 
the state in the vast remote areas, which contributed to the major political parties’ failure 
to consolidate their political achievements after 1990.260 According to Maharjan, inter-
party and intra-party power struggles for the numerical equation in the parliament greatly 
threatened the political stability in Nepal. As a result, people’s dissatisfactions and 
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concerns started to manifest as demands and political campaigns just two years after the 
establishment of the new political system.261   
The majority of scholars believe that failure to deliver as per the Nepalese 
people’s aspirations of economic development and good governance by the newly 
established democracy in 1990 set off the Maoists’ armed struggle in Nepal. Seddon and 
Hussain reinforce this view, noting that the, “failure of development and of governance 
created the pre-conditions, such as poverty, inequality, social discrimination and lack of 
social justice and democracy for widespread discontent, and ultimately for the Maoist 
insurgency.”262 Quoting Lund and Mehler’s model, which divides the root causes of 
conflict into four main areas, Manish Thapa explains: “First, imbalance of political, 
social, economic, and cultural opportunities; second, illegitimate, undemocratic, and 
inefficient governance; third, absence of opportunities for the peaceful reconciliation of 
group interests and for bridging dividing lines between groups; last, absence of an active 
and organized civil society.” Nearly all of these causes mentioned were present in Nepal 
in the 1990s.263  
In Kashmir, there are also some similarities with Nepal in the rise of the 
insurgency, such as political manipulation, bad governance, less-focused economic 
development, and slow democratic transition. Both countries were lacking the effective 
political and economic lines of operations in their COIN strategies to address these 
legitimate grievances of the people as well as weaknesses of the state. More extensive 
analysis will be provided in the following chapter.   
B. NEPALESE COIN CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MAOIST INSURGENCY 
The Maoist insurgency was the most serious domestic security threat that Nepal 
had encountered in the nearly two-and-a-half centuries of its modern history. Since 1995, 
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Nepal has mobilized its security forces to fight the insurgency and maintain internal 
peace and security. The COIN campaign experienced failure in 2006 when the Maoists 
successfully overthrew the monarchy-led government of Nepal by reaching a 
comprehensive peace agreement with other parliamentary parties. While analyzing the 
failure of the Nepalese COIN campaign, some elements of the mixed approach, which are 
considered to be the essential prerequisites for the success of the COIN campaign, will be 
evaluated and also compared to the Indian COIN campaign Kashmir. These elements 
include effective security operations to defeat the armed elements of insurgency and 
protect the population, political methods of addressing the people’s grievances, and 
overall socio-economic development in the insurgency-affected region.  
1. Security Operations 
In order to analyze the effectiveness of the security forces operations of the COIN 
campaign, the insurgency period is divided into the two phases, the first phase from1995 
to 2000 (police-led operations) and the second phase from 2001 to 2006 (army-led 
operations). 
a. First Phase (From 1995 to 2001—Complete Failure of the Police 
Operations) 
For the first time, in 1995 the NC-led government responded to the Maoists with a 
violent police action, namely ‘Operation Romeo’, which was explained to parliament by 
the then Home Minister as—a special security program. As argued by Thapa, the Maoists 
began the Sija (Sisne to Jaljale) campaign in Rolpa and Rukum to launch politico-
ideological preparation in September 1995; they started clashes with local leaders and 
cadres of NC, UML, and the Rastrite Prajantra party.264 To counter these activities, 
“Police teams had been dispatched to eight village development committees, 70 persons 
had been arrested before the security operation and 117 since then, and a number of guns 
and khukuris (Nepalese Knives) had been recovered from houses.”265 It was said that the 
264 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 71. 
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police action was taken against the anti-monarchy and anti-democracy movements. At the 
same time, all village chairmen elected on the UPF were arrested, nearly 6,000 locals left 
the village, and other supporters, including hundreds of ordinary citizens, were arrested 
without any warrants and tortured. As a result, the affected population started viewing the 
government as the enemy, which further prepared the favorable condition for armed 
movement.266 
Until 1998, the government responded to the Maoists threat with oppressive 
police operations while the Maoists continued to conduct guerrilla attacks against people 
and local opposition political leaders and their cadres to expand their base of support in 
other regions of the country.267 As Lawoti claims, “People followed the Maoists dictates 
because of fear—the mobile Maoist army or militia could visit any time to take ‘actions,’ 
which could include minor punishment, public humiliation through garlanding with shoes 
and shaving of heads, torture even death.”268 The Maoists also kidnapped police and 
government officers, better-off people, local teachers, and media persons who were 
opposing their movements, and forced them to leave the village. They also confiscated 
their property and land for the party use. The Maoist insurgents continued their violent 
attacks on police posts in districts of Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot of mid-western Nepal, 
Gorkha in Western Nepal, and Sindhuli in Eastern Nepal. Eventually, the Maoists 
became successful in displacing the state, its agencies, and the opposition political 
supporters from rural areas.269  
The Nepalese people did not react to this type of behavior of the Maoists for a 
long time because the successive governments of Nepal had marginalized the rural 
populations politically and economically. Also, the government lacked a comprehensive 
civil-military campaign plan to fight insurgency and protect the population and state 
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agencies from violence and aggressive behaviors. The police response from the very 
beginning was even more repressive than that of the Maoists.  
In 1998, the police conducted Operation Kilo Sierra Two, which proved to be 
counter-productive due to the indiscriminate violence of police personnel against the 
population in the name of suppressing the Maoist extremism. According to a fact stated 
by several human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, “The police in 
many places have killed more innocent civilians than guerrillas.”270 This operation 
pushed many innocent people to support the Maoists. As Lawoti argues, “the state not 
only failed to repress the insurgency, but its counter-insurgency activities fuelled the 
insurgency because of the haphazard deployment of force. Further, the Maoist rebellion 
grew rapidly owing to the irresponsible response of the state.”271 Because it failed to 
distinguish the rebels from the population and attacked both together, the COIN 
campaign became extremely painful for the local people.  
In 1999, the government formed the High-level Committee under NC leader Sher 
Bahadur Deuba to provide suggestions to solve the Maoist problems.272 This committee 
concluded that the spread of Maoist violence was not due to any failure of democracy, 
but due to the weakness of the state’s management and administration and to frequent 
change in the government. It was again unable to identify the root causes of the 
insurgency. The committee also was not able to recognize that the use of excessive force 
by the state was increasing the people’s support for the Maoist movements273   
In early November 2000, the NC-led government under Prime Minister G.P. 
Koirala wanted to end the violence and bring the Maoists into main-stream politics 
through dialogue, but this effort failed due to the Maoists’ betrayal. Because the strategy 
and fighting strength of the Maoists were overwhelming, they were able to launch attacks 
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against under-manned and ill-equipped policemen in remote posts until that time.274 
Afterward, the Maoists increased their attacks and displaced government infrastructure 
and police outposts in various parts of the country. As a result, the death toll rose 
dramatically, such that 70 police died in one bloody week.275 It was seen as a turning 
point in their armed approach that they attacked with large human waves of fighters 
outnumbering police.  
The Maoists’ terrorist activities and connected trend of organized crimes appeared 
to be increasing within the state. To handle criminal activities and to tackle the 
insurgency, the government perceived an immediate need for an Armed Police Force 
(APF) with modern weaponry. Subsequently, the APF was established on October, 24, 
2001.276 As stated by Tiwari, “The amount allocated for the purchase of modern arms 
was U.S. $4.72 million, nearly twice the allocation for development.”277 The APF made 
slow progress in regard to the operational demands, but again focused only on a 
repressive response against the insurgency and also fuelled the Maoists through 
indiscriminate killings and human rights violations. 
b. Analysis of the First Phase Security Operations  
During this phase from 1995 to 2000, the government of Nepal justified 
oppressive policies in the name of suppressing the insurgency but offered no alternatives 
to address the basic inequalities of the local people. This contributed to the escalation of 
the conflict from the mid-western region to the rest of the country. To fight the rebels 
effectively, the government made a decision to increase the daily allowance and added 
some other incentives for the police force working in the Maoist-affected areas, 
specifically the police team could kill or capture more rebels.278 This approach, famously 
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known as Target Out (kill them), led the police to use unlawful and indiscriminate actions 
to prove that the Maoists were active in their area. For example, when the Romeo 
Operation (1995), Kilo Shera-2 and Jungle Search Operations (1998-99) and Silent Kilo 
Shera-3, Delta and Chakrabihu Operations (2000-May 2001) were launched, the police 
forces actually killed more innocent civilians than the terrorists, which caused further 
resentment and feeling of revenge.279 These operations proved to be ineffective in 
controlling the rebel activities or gaining local support, as stated by several human rights 
organizations, including Amnesty International.280 As argued by Tiwari, “These police 
operations have applied the policy of encircle and kill, a policy similar to that of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s campaign to exterminate Communists in China in the 1930s.”281 The 
government therefore did not recognize the importance of the people as the center of 
gravity of the campaign in the insurgency-affected areas.  
The government, however, launched the Integrated Security and Development 
Program (ISDP) in 2001 to win the hearts and minds of the people through development 
and security measures in tandem. According to Tiwari, “The government has allocated 
U.S. $2.6 million to a development package called the basket fund,”282 but which was 
even less than the budget of a newly formed APF. Along with this initiative, the 
government also deployed the NA to provide protection to district headquarters of the 
Maoist-affected districts, such as Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Salyan, Gorkha, and Sindhuli. 
While the idea of development was the right step, it could not progress as expected due to 
weak governance, delayed execution, and lack of sufficient resources. The Maoists also 
easily blocked the government’s efforts in remote parts of these districts under their 
control.283 As claimed by Thapa, “it is worth recounting some of the points listed as the 
reasons that played a role in the complexity of this [Maoist] problem as it dealt with 
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matters other than the purely political.”284 In the case of Kashmir, the Indian government 
and Kashmiri authorities also used the same heavy-handed security response against the 
separatist insurgency with very a limited WHAM campaign in the 1990s. This approach 
resulted in the failure of the campaign, as in Nepal. More extensive analysis will be 
provided in the following chapter. 
c. Second Phase (From 2001 to 2006—Tactical Success of the Army-Led 
Operations) 
In June 2001, the royal family was massacred by Prince Dipendra. Before he was 
also fatally shot himself, Prince Dipendra killed the king leaving the throne to his uncle, 
King Gyanendra. The Nepalese people were shocked by this, leading to further 
destabilization, which was furthered by a vague investigation report and some conspiracy 
theories.285 The Maoists took this as an opportunity to further speed up their political and 
armed actions.  
Following this incident, the Nepalese government became flexible to deal with the 
Maoists by negotiation. As a result, the Maoists and the government agreed to hold their 
first peace talks in August and declared a ceasefire in June 2001. By November, they had 
failed to agree on key issues, and immediately the Maoists resumed attacks by launching 
an attack on the army barracks of an infantry company deployed in Dang, mid-western 
Nepal.  
The Maoist attack on the army barracks forced the parliament to declare a state of 
emergency to mobilize NA for the first time in a COIN campaign within the country; this 
curtailed some of the citizens’ fundamental rights and declared the Maoists a terrorist 
organization.286 The Maoists movement was addressed under the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Bill, which was passed in April, 2001. 
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According to Thapa, “The government banned the Maoists and its fraternal organizations, 
and harsh penalties were announced for anyone suspected of helping the rebels, Deuba 
[PM] also declared that there would be no further talking until the rebels disarmed.”287 
This demonstrated that the Nepalese government wanted to deal with the insurgency by a 
more aggressive approach, seeking military resolution of a political problem.  
In February 2002, the NA received another setback when the Maoists completely 
overran the army’s forward operating base at Mangal Sen in far-western Nepal and 
slaughtered all military personnel deployed there.288 The Maoists were also able to seize 
all military weapons and equipment. This was the district HQ of the Achham, where all 
the administrative offices were located, and this operating base would provide security to 
staff and infrastructure as well. This successful Maoist attacks on a military post raised 
the two serious concerns.289 First, it raised questions about the NA’s readiness and its 
capability to fight against the insurgency as the army had been closely observing the 
situation for more than five years. In this context, the army could not claim to be 
surprised and unprepared because there was enough time to learn the Maoists’ tactics and 
evaluate their strengths and weaknesses.290 The government, the population, and other 
political parties had expected a lot after the deployment of the army against the Maoists. 
Second, as a result of the successful attack on the military base, the Maoists were 
now better equipped with modern arms, and their morale had received a boost, which 
greatly contributed to their enhanced strength and capabilities.291 Now armed with 
automatic weapons, guns, and mortars, the motivated rebels were ready to sacrifice their 
lives for the cause and even sharpened their fighting skills. By contrary, the army 
suffered serious casualties, a huge blow to morale and significant damage to its 
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credibility.292 From the very beginning, this forced the NA to indiscriminately use force 
against the suspects, supporters, and family members of known Maoists. Thus, the 
militarist approach adversely affected the general population, instead of protecting them 
from the Maoists. According to Chalmers, “A successful counterinsurgency would 
depend on close cooperation from ordinary people, but soldiers [NA] were widely seen 
as, at best aloof and detached from their fellow countrymen.”293  
In the lately drafted NA’s civil-military campaign plan of 2002, the NA’s general 
concept of operations for COIN ascertains the value of civil-military cooperation and 
combined efforts of national resources against the Maoist insurgency.294 The campaign 
plan identifies the following important tasks: offensive operations against the Maoists’ 
bases; securing the road and air lines of communication; conducting search and destroy 
and counter-smuggling operations along the border and in national parks and wild life 
reserves; securing district administrative infrastructure and staff, collecting and sharing 
intelligence; implementing information operations, and development projects, according 
to Letch.295 Political parties, the government, bureaucrats, and the local administration, 
however, did not recognize the importance of the comprehensive campaign plan to defeat 
the insurgency and gain support from the affected people with various lines of operations. 
As argued by Chalmers, the army was not satisfied with the successive governments, 
which it viewed as mismanaging the army, and “it blamed political leaders for the failure 
to develop a coherent civil-military counterinsurgency campaign and felt that it had to 
shoulder the brunt of the task without adequate political support.”296 Without any support 
from local political leaders and cadres as well as lacking reliable and credible 
intelligence, the units and sub-units of NA deployed in forward operating bases had to 
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focus only on the military-led tactical operations rather than on incorporating a campaign 
to win hearts and minds.297 
In 2002–2003, an already bad internal security and political situation grew worse 
when the NC split into two rival factions on the issue of forming the government and 
dealing the Maoist rebellion. At the same time, the UML also refused to lead the 
government as well. This political development forced the king to disband parliament and 
appoint a new government under his direct control, using the extraordinary powers 
granted to him by the constitution of Nepal.298 This political turmoil, however, did not 
affect the NA’s efforts against the rebels in 2002. Instead, the RNA-led operations 
achieved some initial advances against the Maoists; it was noted that there was a sharp 
increase in the level of violence as well.299 The greater firepower of the NA along with 
APF and police helped to launch more effective security operations than before, which 
forced the Maoists to adjust their tactics from constant engagements and to propose a 
cease-fire. The government agreed to announce another ceasefire and the peace talks 
started, but again ended inconclusively. According to Chalmers, the NA viewed the 2003 
ceasefire as, “a cunning Maoist ploy to escape from successful military pressure.”300 The 
army believed that the cease fire would give the Maoists time and space to regroup, 
refresh, and prepare for further offensive actions. 
In 2004, the NA drafted the COIN doctrine with help from Indian, U.S., and 
British military advisors, but it was too little and too late.301 According to the NA’s 
COIN manual, the insurgency should be dealt with both through effective security 
operations to destroy the insurgent fighters and campaign aimed at winning the hearts and 
minds campaigns of the people. The latter are intended to gain popular support through 
economic development programs, psychological operations, and military-civic actions. 
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As stated by Chalmers, “COAS Pyar Jung Thapa publicly instructed his personnel that 
the people involved in the Maobadi [Nepali term for Maoists] terrorist activities are our 
own people who have been misled and have taken the wrong path…(our) mission is not 
to totally eliminate them but to disarm them.”302 The only state institution actively 
involved in COIN, however, was the NA, which was not trained, equipped, or resourced 
well for population-centric operations and community policing. Instead the NA was 
trained conventionally for full-on fighting in war. Because it lacked preparations for the 
different lines of operations by other machineries of the state to defeat the insurgency and 
gain people’s support, the NA had to focus primarily on military operations, which 
contributed very little to winning back people’s support.303  
By 2005, the king-led government continued its support to increase the strength 
and to arm the NA with modern sophisticated weapons, equipment, vehicles, and aircraft, 
an effort which had already been initiated and approved by the previous NC-led 
government. The strength of the army increased from 45,000 within only one division 
when the Maoists attacked in 2001 to 72,000 in 2004,304 and the APF and police were 
also expanded in small numbers. International assistance also helped to train, organize, 
and arm the security forces to fight effectively against the Maoists. Foreign assistance in 
terms of weapons, vehicles, equipment, aircraft, and training to the security forces from 
India, China, UK, and the U.S. played a major role in strengthening its capability to fight 
against the rebels.305 The foreign assistance was not sufficient to prevent a Maoist 
victory; it, however definitely helped the military to hold the rebels at a military 
stalemate.306  
According to Mehta and Lawoti, “The NA, with these improvements, began to 
claim that it was winning the war. In May 2005, the Royal Government claimed that it 
302 Ibid., 36‒37 
303 Ibid., 37. 
304 Ibid., 56. 
305 Kreuttner, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 38‒43. 
306 Ibid., 43. 
 83 
                                                 
had broken the back of the Maoists and killed 600 of them since February, captured 350 
guns and 13,700 bullets.”307 They further stated, from the end of ceasefire in August 
2003 to September 2005, 4,546 Maoists were killed and 2,889 surrendered.308 This 
subsequent rise in casualties after the deployment of the NA led to the decline in 
recruitments by the Maoists. They also became unable to capture any military 
installations and district HQs even after they overran them. Meanwhile, they suffered a 
big defeat in Khara in April 2005. The NA had succeeded in proving to the rebels that it 
was almost impossible to defeat the army by direct confrontation, which forced the 
Maoists to quit their military options for some time and seek a peace settlement with the 
government.309 The Nepalese security forces, however, were considered as one of the 
world’s worst human rights abusers, as argued by Letch. He notes, “Nepal continued to 
commit numerous serious abuses through 2005,” such as arbitrary and maximum use of 
lethal weapons, disappearances, and abuse and torture of detainees, suspects, and 
supporters.310  
The Maoists also realized that if they remained strictly focused on the people’s 
war, they would miss opportunities to find a political solution through peace negotiation 
and the movement would be drawn out.311 They ended the strategic stalemate in 2005 
with a political agreement with the major opposition political parties, the Seven Party 
Alliances (SPA), who were not satisfied with the king’s direct control of the state. 
Interestingly, the negotiations and agreement were mediated by the close neighbor, India. 
Later, the SPA, with active involvement of the Maoists, organized a mass protest against 
the king and ultimately forced him to give up direct rule and reinstate the parliament in 
April 2006.312  
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d. Analysis of the Second Phase Security Operations 
During this phase, being the most important element of national power, the NA 
was actively involved against the Maoists insurgents. Due to limited political directions 
from the frequently changed government, bureaucratic assistance, judicial support, and 
good will of the people, the NA was obliged to operate in isolation to protect the 
population from being forced to surrender to communist rule.313 The late-mobilizing NA, 
however, faced several setbacks during the campaign. The NA had insufficient personnel 
and equipment, inadequate training, and poor intelligence during the initial phase of its 
involvement.314 The army was organized, trained, and armed according to the 
conventional set-up and was given primarily ceremonial roles during the decades under 
Panchayet regimes. According to Thomas Marks, “As matters worked out, the RNA [now 
NA] was the only element of the government which actually fulfilled its role,” at the local 
level.315  
While NA was not successful in decisively suppressing and defeating the Maoist 
insurgency strategically, however, it did succeed tactically in constraining them from 
launching major military actions against the security forces in remote rural areas. As a 
result, the Maoist leadership started shifting their violent movement toward gathering 
support from the opposition political parties and other ethnic minorities. This made them 
successful in creating an environment to mobilize nationwide mass movements along 
with other political parties against the state, through Indian support. Eventually, the 
existing government of Nepal was overthrown and replaced by the new coalition 
government of the Maoists and opposition parties. The government’s COIN campaign 
from 1996 to 2006 to defeat the insurgency had failed, and the Maoists became the main 
political players in Nepalese politics. 
On the other hand, the Indian military in Kashmir after 2000 started to conduct 
better planned, organized, and co-ordinated security operations against insurgents and 
313 Poudyal, “Nepal Army and COIN,” 41. 
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intruders as well as winning the hearts and minds campaign to support the local 
population. This enabled the Indian military to effectively contain the insurgency, 
prevented a large-scale guerrilla campaign from developing in Kashmir, and forced 
insurgents to limit themselves to terrorist activities only. Effective COIN operations have 
also provided the favorable security situation for the Indian government to initiate 
political and economic process in Kashmir. More extensive analysis on this will be 
provided in the following chapter. 
2. Political Process 
Politically, the government of Nepal failed to address the roots of internal 
political, social, and economic causes of the Maoist insurgency when Nepal had 
experienced 15 different governments from 1990 to April 2006.316 Political instability 
made democratic transition difficult and prevented the government from acting 
appropriately against the insurgency. The political parties and politicians could never rise 
above their individual and party interests. Their self-interest was the state’s routine 
business as illustrated by rampant corruption, exclusiveness, and non-transparent 
practices. Petty differences based on individual interests also kept the politicians far from 
reaching consensus on how to deal with the Maoist insurgency as a serious internal 
threat.317 According to Marks, “Not only did governments change with startling rapidity, 
on average one per year, but governance was only possible due to the formation of 
various intra-and even inter-party coalitions.”318  
The political parties and the successive governments of Nepal also failed to 
develop a coherent COIN strategy to fight the insurgency. According to Yubaraj Grimire, 
they “never developed a clear understanding as to the proper use of military force, instead 
316 Ibid. 
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the state adopted a reactive policy.”319 The government and the security forces’ efforts 
adopted the enemy-centric approach without recognizing the importance of the popular 
support that pushed the neutral population toward the Maoists’ control. This strategy 
lacked the appropriate lines of operations as well as instruments to address the political, 
social, and economic problems. An overly militaristic COIN strategy only attempted to 
contain the Maoist insurgency, but it was unable to gain popular support.320  
As Kreuttner observes, “State withdrawal from insurgency areas only made it 
more difficult for the government to gain popular support from the population.”321 In 
addition, the government’s choice of a singular focus on a military solution, such as the 
initial police repression with extensive human right violations, formation of the APF and 
continuation of repression, and an over-emphasized dependency on NA’s efforts in the 
later phase, drove the population far from the state. This situation was exploited well by 
the insurgents. The introduction of the ISDP, with military deployment to district HQs, 
however, was a first right step by the government to address the socio-economic issues. 
Even so, the state’s execution was again weak and eventually blocked by the Maoists. 
During the whole campaign, no government regime recognized the importance of 
winning hearts and minds to gain popular support as the center of gravity for the 
counterinsurgents as well as the insurgents. On the other hand, the Maoists successfully 
used popular support throughout the campaign. 
Another important aspect of the successful COIN strategy of any government is 
the unity of efforts or the integrated interagency efforts, which emphasize the necessity of 
the combined responses of all national resources at every level to achieve the set end 
state. In the case of the Nepalese COIN campaign, this was the main problem from the 
strategic and operational levels to the tactical level. According to Lawoti, “The RNA 
319 Yubaraj Ghimire, “The Many Dimensions of Nepali Insurgency,” in Building a CATR Research 
Agenda, Proceedings of the Third Annual International Symposium of the Center of Asian Terrorism 
Research (CATR), ed. Caroline Ziemke (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2006), ii-8, IDA Paper 
P-4163 ( March 1‒3). 
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[now NA] was deployed late because of mistrust between the king and the political 
parties as well as suspicion between the political parties and the RNA.”322 Also, the NA’s 
officers accused the parties of marginalizing the army as compared to the police, claiming 
that “the political party governments instead of democratizing the army, considered the 
army anti-democratic.”323 In a deepening rivalry between the army and police, they 
accused each other of serving the monarchy or serving the political parties, respectively. 
Moreover, the constitution of 1990 prevented the mobilization of the army in domestic 
security conflicts without an emergency declaration. The king and parties were not in 
favor of imposing the emergency, which led to the formation of the APF as a new 
security organization to fight against the already matured Maoist threat.324  
Due to the lack of unity of efforts at every level, the government faced problems 
of reliable and credible operational intelligence on counterinsurgents and strategic 
intelligence for appropriate decision making and policy formulation. At the tactical level, 
the security forces had to rely on captured insurgents or local agents. Also, there was a 
problem in intelligence sharing among various agencies due to mistrust among them. By 
contrast, the Maoists enjoyed intelligence advantages at all levels as compared to the 
government and security forces. In the later phases of the campaign, however, a unified 
command integrating all security agencies under the NA’s command and control was 
established, and it started operating, but not as effectively as expected. 
Political parties and the Nepalese government also failed to understand the real 
intention of the ceasefire requested by the Maoist leadership. The Maoists always 
managed every ceasefire to their benefit as they used these periods for recruitment, 
collection of donations, strengthening the organization by forming different fronts, and 
preparation and planning for further violent attacks.325 For instance, during the first 
322 Lawoti and Pahari, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 22. 
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ceasefire in 2001, the Maoists expanded their bases from 14 to 57 districts.326 
Immediately after the peace talks, they were able to attack the NA barracks in Dang for 
the first time. During the second ceasefire, the Maoist leadership rigorously expanded and 
strengthened their organization from 57 to 72 districts and then throughout the country 
during the final ceasefire. During and after all ceasefires, the Maoist leadership was 
successful in building public relations, accumulating funds, and getting the release of 
most of the cadres from jails.327 
The royal takeover of the government, suspension of civil liberties, and increased 
military deployment in 2005 did more to harm than good the government’s COIN efforts. 
More importantly, the king’s action opened up a three-front political contest among the 
king-led government, the major political parties, and the Maoist insurgents.328 The 
political power of the country was distributed among them. First, the king and his 
supporters controlled the state resources and security forces. Second, the main-stream 
political parties with strong international support entertained marginal public support, and 
lastly, the Maoists with their various organizations and fighters controlled rural Nepal.329 
Meanwhile, international support to the Nepalese government was diminished as the 
U.S., UK, and India completely halted transferring lethal weapons, equipment, and other 
military and economic assistance to Nepal.330 This change directly affected the 
operational efficiency of the security forces on the ground. India also withdrew from a 
summit of the SAARC scheduled for February 2005.331 With these conditions, the state 
now started facing political, economic, and security difficulties at the same time. 
India initiated the negotiation process between the major opposition political 
parties and the Maoists in New Delhi. India facilitated reaching an agreement among 
326 Prem Sahi, “Prachanda: The Mastermind behind the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate College, 2010), 34‒39, accessed November 23, 2013, 
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these groups to jointly mobilize the nation-wide mass movements against the government 
of Nepal. As a result, the king-led government was overthrown and a new government of 
the Maoists and opposition political parties was formed. The then government’s COIN 
campaign became a complete failure in defeating the Maoist insurgency. Without support 
from the Indian government, the opposition political parties and ethnic communities of 
Nepal, the Maoists would not have been able to achieve this “safe landing” and gain the 
upper hand in the political negotiations, as argued by many domestic and external 
scholars and strategists.  
3. Socio-Economic Development  
After the reestablishment of democracy, the government of Nepal never tried to 
address grievances of the marginalized population through the socio-economic 
development programs. Nepal was and still is among the poorest countries of the world. 
In 1990s, the Nepalese economy was very fragile because of the lack of farsighted 
economic engagement, “inefficiencies, waste, and widespread corruption.”332 This 
already disturbed economy had been affected heavily by the Maoist insurgency. Along 
with the decrease in agricultural production, as Thapa claims, “The bleak economy 
situation and reduction in growth has been attributed” to the mass displacement and 
migration of farmers from conflict-affected areas.333 The Maoists targeted “industries, 
mainly foreign investment, and joint venture companies in the manufacturing sectors.”334 
Moreover, the government infrastructures were also heavily destroyed by them. Nepal 
was left with no major industries and tourism business for earning foreign currency; the 
economic condition of the country was declining each day. No economic program had 
been implemented effectively in the remote areas where majority populations were living 
in acute poverty.335  
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Both the government and the international partners were unable to activate the 
available national resources and energy to formulate a long-term development strategy 
during the period from 1990 to 2006, due to Nepal’s domestic mismanagement and 
contradictions in the international aid system.336 According to Pandey, internal factors 
are, “the long neglected causes of failed development—the exclusionary nature of the 
Nepalese state and its patrimonial character also explain the outbreak of violent conflict 
in the mid-1990s.”337 Also, the government had to allocate more budget to manage 
unplanned extra security expenditures rather than development programs. As Thapa 
states, “Aid agencies have been equally affected as their programs and projects on the 
ground have been compromised by the insurgency and surrounding conflicts.”338 
Regardless of the amount Nepal receives in foreign aid, these funds had not been utilized 
properly. Insecurity and uncertainty from the insurgency and COIN operations combined 
with the administrative burdens and corruption-related problems caused a sharp decline 
in outsiders’ and insiders’ investment in Nepal. Even worse, Nepalese capital started 
moving rapidly out of the country.339 
Another important pillar of the national economy is the tourism sector. During the 
insurgency period, this sector was badly affected by declining tourist arrivals to Nepal. 
Due to the insecurity caused by the Maoist insurgency, its general strikes, and the state’s 
security operations nationwide, the tourism industry suffered a “negative growth rate of 
almost 7 percent.”340 This decline also put pressure on the banking sector, which cut off 
the flow of the loans to impacted tourism businesses. According to Thapa, “tourism 
brought in more than U.S.$ 160 million a year and provided employment to more than 
200,000 people.”341 Thus, the state faced a huge revenue loss as well as jobs reduction 
for the people. The state was not in the position to guarantee the safety and security of the 
336 Ibid., 95. 
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foreign tourists visiting Nepal or to promote the tourism industry. These economic 
problems hampered the development process, which provided a favorable environment 
for the Maoist insurgency.  
4. Analysis of the Government’s Overall Approach  
The reasons for the government being unable to combat the Maoists were mainly 
political instability, repressive tactics, and the failure to solve socio-economic issues of 
marginalized groups in the initial period of the insurgency. In the later stage, the failure 
to establish a democratic government with recognized legitimacy prevented Nepal’s 
movement in the international arena. Political instability created by the self-centric nature 
of the political parties contributed to the governance crises.342 The successive 
governments largely suffered from the mistrust and suspicion among parties, king, and 
military. Partitions within the parties led to ineffective and unresponsive behavior in 
addressing state affairs. The government suffered from widespread corruption, abuse of a 
power, a culture of impunity, and a politicized administration, which increased 
dissatisfaction among common citizens. Also, the successive governments were unable to 
expand the state’s presence, improve the economy, or address social inequalities that 
existed in the countryside where the Maoists easily penetrated into the population, 
exploited the people’s grievances, and later extensively enjoyed their support.343  
The Nepalese COIN campaign lacked a coherent and comprehensive strategy and 
the resourceful and well-trained security forces to deal with rebellion. The government, 
from the very beginning, focused on a military resolution to a political problem. The 
security forces operated against the organized insurgency without well-designed COIN 
doctrine, training, and rules of engagement. The state was extremely weak in early 
warning and early countermeasures in remote areas.  
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With these weaknesses, the NA was successful in some rural areas tactically in 
constraining the insurgents from launching major military actions against the security 
forces in the later phase. The Maoist leadership, however, started shifting their violent 
movement toward gathering support from the opposition political parties and other ethnic 
minorities of Nepal, as well from the Indian government. This made them successful in 
creating an environment in which to mobilize nationwide mass movements along with 
other political parties against the state. Eventually, the existing government of Nepal was 
overthrown and replaced by the new coalition government of the Maoists and opposition 
parties. Therefore, I argue that the government’s COIN campaign from 1996 to 2006, 
intended to defeat the insurgency, failed, and this allowed the Maoists to become one of 
the major political players in Nepalese politics. The government could not control these 
movements in any way because the government’s own COIN approach was not focused 
on dealing with insurgency by gaining popular support and addressing their legitimate 
demands. It also lacked the different lines of operations of a comprehensive COIN 
campaign, such as diplomatic, economic and intelligence aspects in the later phase of the 
campaign.  
In Kashmir, the Indian government changed its COIN strategy from the enemy- 
centric approach to the mixed approach after 2000. This changed approach has made the 
Indian security forces effective in conducting the intelligence-led COIN operations and a 
campaign to win hearts and minds based on the doctrinal pattern under the well-
coordinated unified command system. Politically, local- and state-level elections have 
been successfully conducted since 2002, which has helped to encourage local people to 
choose their own representatives in center, state, and local bodies. The diplomatic 
initiatives and negotiations have equally played an important role in deescalating tensions 
as well as finding common confidence-building measures. Meanwhile, long-term as well 
as short-term socio-economic development projects have become one of the key elements 
of the COIN strategy in Kashmir. More extensive analysis of this approach will be 
provided in the following chapter.  
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C. CONCLUSION  
In 1990, internal political pressure, as well as the people’s movement, led to the 
end of the party-less Panchayet system that had existed for three decades. The multi-party 
democracy was re-established under the aegis of a new constitution of Nepal. Even 
though the state’s main responsibility was to promote and protect the lives and property 
of its people and improve their well-being based on the principles of a free society, its 
political leaders seemed to be extremely corrupt, self-centered, and dominated by the 
same elites of the past regimes. Thus, the successive governments failed to address the 
long-neglected aspirations of the politically excluded and socio-economically 
disadvantaged Nepalese people, which ultimately provided the Maoists a favorable 
pretext for their movement, starting from agitations to armed rebellion against the state in 
Nepal.344 In Kashmir, the Indian government in the 1990s solely focused on a military 
response to insurgency and failed to address legitimate grievances of the Kashmiri 
people. The mixed COIN approach integrating security, political, socio-economic, and 
diplomatic measures that was adopted after 2000 (and continues to the present), however, 
has led to recent success in Kashmir. The campaign is an ongoing one. 
The start of the Maoist insurgency, however, was not only the result of emerging 
political instability and economic and socio-cultural inequalities after 1990, as discussed 
earlier, but also, represented a continuation of a generation of radical cadres with the 
communist ideology of class struggle.345 Influenced by both the Chinese Maoist and 
Indian Naxalite movements, they were in favor of launching an armed rebellion as an 
extension of their political struggle against the elite domination of the politico-economic 
life of the country. This was their goal that had never been achieved in the past.346 Since 
the 1990s, the Maoists have claimed this motivation and adopted the violent way of 
getting hold of state power.347  
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The Maoist leadership easily exploited their constitutionally guaranteed freedom 
and rights in the post-democratic period to organize politically as well as militarily and 
started an armed movement to achieve their political objectives.348 A key to the Maoists’ 
success was their ability to mobilize dissatisfied classes, lower castes, Dalits, women, and 
ethnic groups in the 1990s. At the later stage, the insurgents’ ability to establish 
successful political engagements with domestic and external factors, such as the 
democratic parties who were opposing the undemocratic rule of the monarch in Nepal 
and the regional power of India, were key as well.349 Thus, the Maoists’ ideological 
ground, dynamic leadership, and selective use of violence, along with weak state 
response, contributed to their success.  
The government had completely failed to recognize the gravity of the problem of 
geographically neglected areas. Instead, the rebels were able to give the impression to the 
general public that they truly represented the interests, needs, and aspirations of the 
geographically isolated, poor, rural population who had been excluded from economic, 
political, and social opportunities mainly because of their location in geographically 
remote and backward areas.350  
The NA only used information warfare on a limited scale, not as a force multiplier 
as it should be conducted from the government level. The state forces operated with a 
lack of intelligence and unity of effort. Due to these deficiencies, the police and military 
operations often could not distinguish the Maoists from the civilians and so would strike 
both together. That mistake pushed people toward the insurgents’ cause and contributed 
to the growth of the rebellion in the country.  
In the early stage of COIN operations, security forces under the lead role of the 
NA faced numerous setbacks. Moreover, the government did not address the country’s 
core socio-economic problems, even with the army’s tactical military success in the later 
348 Ibid. 
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phase.351 Politically, the division between the parliamentary parties and the king after his 
coup in 2005 led to further repressive responses and divisions that created domestic and 
international opposition. Subsequently, the government lacked internal as well as external 
support and finally dropped a victory into the hands of the Maoists in 2006.352 As a 
result, the existing king-led government was overthrown and then formed a new coalition 
government with the Maoists and other opposition political parties. The Nepalese 
constitution drafted after the People’s Movement in 1990 was replaced by the interim 
constitution of Nepal. Hence, the Nepalese COIN approach was completely lost. The 
government was inefficient and unable to mobilize all elements of national power to 
defeat the insurgency and to win popular and diplomatic support.  
After analyzing the Nepalese COIN campaign, we can see that the COIN strategy 
needs more than an enemy-centric approach to be successful. The government must be 
able to formulate a comprehensive civil-military campaign plan to include political 
process and socio-economic programs, information and intelligence support, and military 
lines of operations. These factors would help to defeat insurgent fighters and win the 
hearts and minds of the people so that they stop providing insurgents with their support, 
but were almost non-existent in the case of Nepal. Instead, the government adopted the 
enemy-centric approach throughout the campaign to address the socio-politico-economic 
causes of insurgency in Nepal.353 As we have seen, though, the mixed COIN approach is 
better at dealing with a complex insurgency in an economically challenged democratic 
setting such as Nepal. An example is that of the Indian government in Kashmir changing 
its COIN strategy from an enemy-centric approach after 2000 to the mixed approach of 
integrating all national instruments that has led to an increased level of success. More 
extensive analysis of this result will be provided in the following chapter. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
Insurgencies are serious internal threats for India and Nepal. The Indian COIN 
campaign against the separatist Kashmiri insurgency from 1990 to the present, and the 
Nepalese COIN campaign against the Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 2006, have both 
experienced failure and success of various degrees at different times. The two cases are 
similar and comparable because, along with violence, both cases also experienced 
extensive ethnic mobilization and external support for the insurgency. 
This chapter compares and analyzes the factors that led to the recent success of 
the Indian COIN approach against the Kashmiri insurgency and failure of the Nepalese 
COIN approach against the Maoists. I will examine the COIN model, the Mixed 
Approach, which was developed based on the analysis of the essential prerequisites for 
the success of COIN campaigns. These fundamentals include adherence to the political 
methods of addressing the people’s grievances and diplomatic initiatives, a strategy for 
overall socio-economic development in the insurgency-affected region, and effective 
security operations to defeat the armed elements of insurgency. Similarly, protecting the 
population from insurgent violence along with a campaign to win the hearts and minds 
and to cultivate relations with international actors are also considered as supporting 
elements for successful COIN operations. Based on the findings of this comparative 
analysis, the chapter also offers some lessons.  
A. EXPLAINING THE FAILURE AND SUCCESS OF THE INDIAN COIN 
CAMPAIGN IN KASHMIR 
1. Enemy-Centric COIN Approach in the 1990s and Its Outcome 
In 1990, India mobilized its army along with other security forces to fight the 
insurgency in Kashmir and began to rely on the armed forces to control the security 
setting. In this phase, Indian COIN strategy largely favored a military solution over a 
political resolution to the insurgency because the Indian security forces not only had to 
deal with the separatist insurgents within Kashmir, but also had to deter Pakistan and 
block terrorist infiltration from the Pakistani side of the LOC. Without effective military 
 97 
operations, it would not have been possible to contain the Islamic separatist insurgency 
that had the active support of Pakistan, the involvement of Islamic jihadi fighters, and 
their religious fervor. Eventually, the Indian army became effective at bringing the 
situation under their control. Additionally, the Indian security forces achieved some 
initial success in Kashmir by preventing the insurgents’ attempts to launch large-scale 
guerrilla warfare and limiting them to terror acts as a way to gain internal and external 
attention.354 The Indian government, however, became ineffective at winning popular 
support because it failed to respect human rights, promote socio-economic development, 
or initiate a political and diplomatic process in the 1990s. The public continued to 
confront the security forces, reject the elections of 1996 and beyond, and provide support 
to the insurgency. 
Politically, throughout the1990s Kashmir remained under the President’s rule. 
The Indian government could not initiate a political process to listen to and address the 
people’s legitimate grievances through a participatory process in state government and 
local bodies. New Delhi’s close ally, Farooq Abdullah of the National Conference, 
however, won the state election of 1996 with minimal voter participation, and the Indian 
government promptly suspended the power transfer to the state. New Delhi blamed the 
state government for not improving the deteriorated situation in Kashmir. In fact, the 
Kashmiri state administration was weak due to political manipulation from the center, 
continued political unrest after the mid-1980s, and armed rebellion after the 1990s, which 
largely made the internal security situation chaotic. The Indian government’s diplomatic 
efforts to solve the Kashmiri insurgency in this phase were also non-existent except for a 
few bilateral engagements. For example, the Indian Prime Minister, Atal B. Vajpayee, 
and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, established a number of confidence-building 
measures to lower tensions over Kashmir in the late 1990s, but these measures ended 
without any progress due to the Kargil conflict. Moreover, the relations between the state 
and the center remained uneasy in the 1990s.  
354 Wagenen, “An Analysis of the Indian Government’s COIN,” 11. 
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With regard to socio-economic development, the Indian focus on addressing these 
grievances of the Kashmiri people received the lowest priority during the 1990s. Lacking 
long-term development projects funded by the center, Kashmir suffered from a high 
unemployment rate and economic disparities among the population, which contributed to 
the radical Islamic insurgents gaining momentum. The resulting violent activities of 
insurgents and COIN operations immensely affected the tourism industry, which had 
been one of the main sectors creating employment opportunities for people and revenue 
for the state. Moreover, the government was not even in a position to provide immediate 
response to victims of the severe violence because the security situation in Kashmir was 
not under control of the security forces. There were mass mobilizations and violent 
activities of the insurgent at the same time. Overall, India was unable to plan and initiate 
appropriate socio-economic development programs or address the people’s immediate 
concerns. As a result, the public continuously confronted the security forces, rejected the 
elections of 1996 and beyond, and provided support to the insurgency. Thus, this singular 
area-focused, military-only approach could not contribute to the overall improvement of 
the situation in Kashmir in the 1990s.  
2. Mixed COIN Approach in the 2000s and Its Outcome  
Due to the above-mentioned setbacks in the Indian COIN strategy of the 1990s, 
India reached the point where it had to change the COIN strategy to win the people’s 
support, defeat insurgent fighters within Kashmir, deter Pakistan from launching 
conventional war, and block terrorists from infiltrating and exfiltrating along the LOC. 
Since then, India has maintained a continuing massive military deployment (Cold Start 
Strategy) along the LOC and launched a people-oriented campaign (Operation 
Sadbhavana) within Kashmir.  
When recent success in Kashmir is examined, we see that what drives this success 
are effective security operations, political process, socio-economic development 
programs, and other people-focused activities. Militarily, the intelligence-led security 
operations based on the doctrinal pattern by better-trained and equipped security forces 
under a well-coordinated unified command system, has been able to degrade the 
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insurgents’ fighting capacity in the 2000s. The Indian security forces operations include a 
campaign to win hearts and minds in urban and rural areas, deployment of the military 
along the LOC, and COIN operations to defeat the insurgent fighters in affected regions. 
As a result, this response has now marginalized the insurgents to the point that they are 
limited only to some terrorist activities. They can no longer launch large-scale guerrilla 
operations against the state and Indian security forces. The massive military presence 
along the LOC has also helped to prevent conventional war by deterring Pakistan and to 
block the infiltration and exfiltration of terrorists through the LOC. The various security 
forces deployed in the grid system under the unified command network and intelligence 
provided by all-weather surveillance radar and human intelligence appear to be effective 
in launching the coordinated and planned operations with less collateral damage and 
fewer human rights violations.  
Politically, the election process that resumed after 2001 has allowed the people to 
choose their own representatives for the state and local bodies with a view to gaining 
legitimacy. The state government has now been in place and is functional. Also, 
diplomatic initiatives, such as the U.S. pressure on Pakistan to ban its terrorist 
organizations, to end the Kargil conflict, and to deescalate the tension caused by the 
military crisis of 2001 and 2002, have helped to re-initiate the negotiation process and 
find common confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan. The Kashmiri 
people now have started considering the state government formed through the democratic 
process as legitimate and effective in controlling social, political, and economic 
institutions, as discussed in Chapter II. Elected representatives from the Kashmiri people 
are now in a position to raise concerns about the people’s grievances and to address these 
issues at different levels through various political mechanisms. This legitimate political 
process was completely non-existent during the 1980s and the 1990s in Kashmir.  
Economically, the long-term as well as short-term socio-economic development 
projects along with an immediate response to the people’s needs have contributed to local 
support for the security forces and the state. With center-funded development projects, an 
increase in revenue from tourism, and an increase in economic growth, the elected state 
legislatures now have the power to create jobs and prioritize programs based on local 
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requirements, such as building roads, schools, and health centers. All these changes in 
Kashmir are positive indicators of socio-economic progress in the 2000s as compared to 
the 1990s. 
Overall, the mixed COIN approach has led to the increased level of success in 
Kashmir in the 2000s. The degree of success now can be measured from witnessing the 
people’s increased participation in the political and electoral process since 2002, 
economic growth with returning tourism, decline in violent incidents and infiltration of 
terrorists through the LOC, establishment and improvement of state and local 
infrastructure, rehabilitation of some of the displaced population, functioning of basic 
popular services, and restoration of some of the urban facilities, which are examined in 
Chapter II.355 The Indian COIN in Kashmir, therefore, shows that the COIN strategy 
requires not only focused military efforts or people-focused efforts, but an integration of 
these efforts to achieve an increased level of success. 
B. EXPLAINING THE FAILURE OF THE NEPALESE COIN CAMPAIGN 
FROM 1996 TO 2006  
In the Nepalese COIN campaign against the Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 
2006, both the elected party-led and the king-led governments of Nepal strictly followed 
the enemy-centric, military-only approach to dealing with the insurgency. The resulting 
security response included repressive police tactics that employed extensive human rights 
violations in the beginning. This response also led to the formation of APF and continued 
repression after 2000, and overemphasized dependence on NA’s efforts in the later phase, 
which drove the population far from the state. This backlash was well-exploited by the 
insurgents. The strategy of “capture and kill” further escalated the violence when a large 
number of the neutral population were targeted as suspected Maoists and treated like 
Maoist cadres, leaders, and sympathizers.  
  
355 John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, “Rethinking Counterinsurgency,” RAND 
Counterinsurgency Study 5 (2008), 61, accessed August 28, 2013, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.5.pdf. 
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The successive governments of Nepal failed to develop a coherent COIN strategy 
and civil-military campaign plan to fight against the Maoist insurgency by balancing the 
military approach with social, economic, and political aspects. This contributed to the 
state’s inability to restore effective governance. The center of gravity of the campaign, 
the population, was largely ignored by the security forces and the state agencies. Limited 
political direction from very unstable governments, frequent change in the government, 
lack of public confidence, insufficient personnel and equipment, inadequate training, and 
poor intelligence led to the failure of the campaign. NA developed a civil-military 
campaign plan and COIN doctrine focusing on both the enemy-centric and the 
population-centric approaches with a view to defeating the insurgent fighters as well as to 
gaining popular support. It was too late, however, to implement and limited in terms of 
resources and space. Tactically, the NA was able to gain success against the Maoists in 
some areas, but the state did not attempt to understand the importance of winning the 
hearts and minds of the people by employing different lines of operations.356 
Politically, the successive governments failed to address political and socio-
economic issues. During this period, Nepal was passing through the critical phase of 
democratic transition from the decades’ long party-less system under the monarch to a 
multi-party democratic system. Meanwhile, the state had to fulfill the long-rooted 
political and socio-economic aspirations of the marginalized population, promote and 
protect the lives and properties of the people, and improve their well-being based on the 
principles of a free and open society. The successive governments and the state 
administration seemed to be extremely corrupt, self–centered, and dominated by the same 
elites of royal regimes. The royal takeover of the government in 2005, suspension of civil 
liberties, and increased military operations did even more harm politically to the 
government’s COIN efforts.  
As far as socio-economic development is concerned, the successive governments 
became unable to formulate any national development strategy or initiate any productive 
socio-economic development projects that would address the legitimate demands of the 
356 Ibid., 37. 
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people living in the remote areas where a majority of the population was under acute 
poverty.357 The Nepalese economy was very fragile because of the lack of farsighted 
economic engagement, inefficiencies, waste, and widespread corruption.358 Due to the 
Maoists’ destructive activities, the state was unable to provide security to the industries 
run by foreign investment or to joint venture companies and development programs 
funded by the international aid system. The trend of increases in security expenditure and 
emergency rescue and response also limited what the government could allocate from the 
budget to socio-economic development programs. With no major industries for earning 
foreign currency, a deteriorating tourism industry due to insecurity, and a decrease in 
agricultural production due to the mass displacement and migration of farmers, the 
economic growth of the country declined heavily. Thus, all these factors contributed to 
the government forming a weak development strategy during the period from 1990 to 
2006.359 
One can still argue that the Nepalese COIN campaign against the Maoist 
insurgency had succeeded in forcing the insurgents to discard their military option for a 
negotiated political process. The Maoists’ choice to search for a political settlement, 
however, was not due to pressure from the NA and negotiation with the government. 
Rather, it was due to the Maoist leadership’s clear understanding of the prevailing 
domestic political and external environment. For example, the royal takeover of the 
government in 2005 made the main-stream political parties stand in strong opposition to 
the government. These parties were supported by the international community as well as 
regional powers. Immediately after the take-over, India along with the U.S. and UK 
completely halted military and economic assistance to the Nepalese government and the 
security forces. Also, the increased military deployment along with the declaration of a 
state of emergency suspended civil liberties that made people lose faith in the 
government. This did even more harm and further eroded popular support. Neither did 
357 Pandey, “The Legacy of Nepal’s Development,” 86‒96. 
358 Ibid., 86.  
359 Pandey, “The Legacy of Nepal’s Development,” 95. 
 103 
                                                 
the government attempt to open dialogue with opposition parties. It also failed to take the 
initiative to keep the confidence of international and regional powers. So, the 
economically weak royal government now lost support from the people, main-stream 
political parties, and the international community, but the government still continued the 
aggressive military operations against the Maoists.  
The Maoist leadership took advantage of the internal political turmoil, people’s 
dissatisfaction with the state, and the external environment to overthrow the government 
and hold state power through a negotiated political process. The leadership intelligently 
switched its military strategy to a balanced politico-military approach. The Maoists were 
more effective in gaining the people’s support than the government of Nepal. They 
created a covert alternative society to address the local socio-economic grievances and 
used both persuasion and coercion to gain people’s support for the rebellion. At the same 
time, the Maoists established good relations with the Indian government, which played a 
major role in mediation between the Maoists and other opposition political parties to act 
jointly against the Nepalese government. Based on this, the Maoists and other opposition 
political parties organized a nationwide mass movement. The state’s security forces under 
the COIN mechanism failed to tackle this situation.  
The Nepalese COIN campaign failed to eliminate insurgents or reduce their 
numbers and capability. Instead, the existing government was overthrown, and a new 
government was formed with the Maoists and the other opposition political parties. The 
Nepalese government executing the COIN campaign became completely illegitimate and 
ineffective in controlling social, political, and economic institutions of the state with the 
collapse of the government. The democratic constitution of 1991 was also replaced by an 
interim constitution. The COIN campaign envisaged under the legal provision of the 
constitution of 1991 ended without any success. In addition, the new government placed 
many barriers on the various issues related to the NA through the comprehensive peace 
agreement. For example, there were restrictions on the military’s size and structure, the 
purchase of arms and equipment from outside, new recruitment, mobilization and 
deployment, and so on. Therefore, I argue that the Nepalese COIN campaign from 1996 
to 2006, which overemphasized a militarist approach, failed to defeat the Maoist 
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insurgency because it did not integrate all other available national instruments with the 
military effort in its COIN strategy. The Nepalese case shows that the COIN strategy 
requires not only focused military efforts, which can be counterproductive, but also more 
than this to achieve success.  
On the other hand, the Maoists joined mainstream politics, easily managed to get 
the upper hand in political negotiations, and successfully enforced their most important 
agendas such as abolition of monarchy, election of constituent assembly, and provision 
for federalism in the interim constitution. They became successful in keeping their armed 
elements supplied with equipment intact in cantonments under the party’s political 
control. During this period, Nepal was a state with two armies.  
The analysis of the effectiveness of the Indian and Nepalese COIN approaches 
has to be done in the context of the domestic conditions and geopolitical environment. 
Domestically, both countries responded to the insurgencies in their own ways. India as an 
economically and militarily emerging and politically more stable country has definitely 
mobilized more resources in fighting insurgency in the later stage of the COIN campaign. 
As a result, it has achieved an increased level of success. On the other hand, Nepal is 
economically weak and militarily less capable than India. Furthermore, it has been in a 
phase of political transformation from the decades of monarchial rule to democracy. As a 
result, it could afford fewer resources to fight the insurgency, which handed the victory 
over to the Maoists. The main important aspect in defeating insurgency is to adopt an 
appropriate COIN strategy that integrates all available national resources with strong 
political will and commitment. Regardless of available national means, that political will 
and commitment was lacking in the case of Nepal as compared to the Indian case of 
Kashmir. As Moore argues, “The strategy must be planned and executed as a fully 
integrated combination of continuing actions, rebuilt structures, and transformed beliefs 
that eventually lead to lasting stability.”360 
360 Moore, “The Basics of Counterinsurgency,” 24. 
 105 
                                                 
Geopolitically, the long-festering Kashmir issue has its origin in the partition of 
British India in 1948, over which India and Pakistan had already fought three wars. This 
bitter and hostile relationship has now turned the region into a nuclear flashpoint. In 
1989, the Kashmir conflict took on a new dimension when the Kashmiris started an 
armed struggle to become independent from India. Therefore, the Kashmir conflict is 
complex and contains conflicting interests of various players: India, Pakistan, and the 
Kashmiri people. All of them have been fighting for a variety of causes; these are 
independence of Kashmir by the separatist Kashmiri, preservation of a secular nation 
fought for by India, and unification of the Muslim state claimed by Pakistan. A country 
without Kashmir is in no way acceptable for both India and Pakistan. The campaign is 
still ongoing. 
By contrast, the Maoist insurgency of Nepal did not receive any official support 
from or establish any link with its neighboring countries initially, even though Nepal is 
situated between India and China. The Maoists represented a typical homegrown 
insurgency, which in due time found India as a safe haven from which to get access to the 
illegal arms market and to organize meetings, get training, and receive treatment for their 
injured cadres during the conflict. More importantly, in the later stage of the conflict, the 
Indian government’s role in mediation between the opposition political parties and the 
Maoists contributed significantly to the Maoists’ interests. As a result, the Maoists and 
other political parties were successful in organizing a nationwide mass movement to 
overthrow the existing government of Nepal and replace it with a new coalition 
government. Thus, the evaluation of any COIN campaign has to be done from domestic 
as well as geopolitical perspectives.   
C. LESSONS FROM COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
The key common factors that contributed to the failure of the Indian COIN in the 
1990s in Kashmir and the ultimate failure of the Nepalese COIN against the Maoist 
insurgency are as follows: the lack of a comprehensive COIN strategy and civil-military 
campaign plan (no use of different lines of operations, for example, political, socio-
economic, and information); limited capability of the security forces (in terms of 
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resources, doctrine, training, tactics, intelligence, and coordination among various 
agencies involved in the campaign); the weakness of the political institutions and poor 
governance; and the use of repressive tactics without initiating any political and socio-
economic process to address the legitimate grievances of the people.  
Even though the Indian security forces in Kashmir seemed effective in causing 
maximum damage to the insurgents in the 1990s, the Indian COIN based on the enemy-
centric approach could not achieve overall success in this phase as the public 
continuously confronted the security forces, rejected the elections of 1996 and beyond, 
and provided support to the insurgency. Similarly, Nepal was also unable to achieve 
success in the 1990s by considering insurgency only as a law and order problem. To find 
the solution to this problem, the Nepalese government adopted only an enemy-centric 
approach of police/military repressive operations throughout the campaign. Thus, as we 
have seen, a successful COIN campaign should be integrated with political, socio-
economic, and security measures and aimed at defeating violence, preventing recurrences 
of such violence, and resolving the root causes of an insurgency.361 
Factors that have led to the increased level of success in Kashmir now are 
effective security operations, legitimate political practices, and socio-economic 
development programs. In the second phase, the Indian army and other security forces 
with modern weapons and equipment, better COIN training, a well-established unified 
command system, timely and credible intelligence, and sound doctrinal guidance have 
been effective at reducing the insurgents’ violence and terrorist infiltration along the 
LOC. Similarly, the political and socio-economic process has also played a vital role in 
gaining popular support and the people’s participation in the state’s legitimate process.  
In the case of Nepal, the government from the national level and the local 
administration grew unable and ineffective to initiate a political and socio-economic 
process to address the genuine grievances of marginalized citizens. The security forces 
were weak in terms of training, resources, intelligence, and political guidance, as well as 
361 Moore, “The Basics of Counterinsurgency,” 3.  
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overall COIN strategy. But it was ultimately the security forces’ continued use of 
repressive tactics that led to lose the people’s support. The NA’s late and meager efforts 
to use both the enemy-centric and limited people-centric approaches were able to achieve 
tactical success, but could not avert strategic failure.  
The comparison between the Indian and Nepalese COIN approaches reveals that 
counterinsurgency campaigns in developing countries with extensive ethnic mobilizations 
and problematic border relations should not rely heavily on an enemy-centric approach. 
By ignoring political and socio-economic programs, counterinsurgency efforts are more 
likely to end up in failure or continue for longer periods of time. Depending upon these 
complexities, neither the population-centric nor the enemy-centric approach alone can 
fully defeat an insurgency.362 Thus, I argue that the mixed approach of integrating all 
national resources in support of the population and against an insurgency is better for 
dealing with the insurgent threats. The combined approach can focus on defeating the 
insurgent fighters by military efforts, and at the same time, address the people’s 
legitimate grievances in order to gain their support by the politico-socio-economic 
process. While adopting the combined approach, a government must also consider 
international factors for a better outcome. 
In summary, I have observed from the cases of Kashmir and Nepal that the early 
application of an enemy-centric approach can be effective in causing maximum damage 
to armed insurgents but cannot lead to a complete success over insurgency. If the COIN 
strategy also encompasses the campaign to win hearts and minds in order to provide an 
immediate response to the affected people, it will help to create a favorable environment 
for a large-scale population-centric approach that includes the political and socio-
economic activities necessary to address the legitimate demands of the people. But, if the 
militaristic strategy is continued for a longer period of time, it may result in maximum 
collateral damage, human rights violations, and ultimately a loss of legitimacy for the 
campaign. Ultimately, the militaristic approach is likely to result in a backlash that directs 
popular support to the insurgents. Most importantly, it does not help to achieve a 
362 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 1‒2. 
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complete victory. This is clearly reflected in both the cases examined in this research. 
This leads to the conclusion that the simplistic division of the COIN approach between 
the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches undermines COIN efforts in 
economically developing democratic countries, especially those dealing with issues of 
ethnic tensions and border disputes with neighboring countries.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis explored the application aspects of the COIN campaigns in Kashmir 
and Nepal by explaining, comparing, and analyzing the insurgencies, the COIN 
approaches, and the outcomes. With an aim of finding a better approach to counter 
insurgency, the following question was posed at the beginning of the research: what 
approach leads to the successful end of insurgencies in economically developing 
democratic countries that are linked with extensive ethnic mobilization and problematic 
border relations? To answer the question, the separate case studies of the Kashmiri and 
Nepalese COIN campaigns were examined and analyzed. The findings of these case 
studies support the argument that a mixed approach of integrating national resources is 
more effective for dealing with insurgencies in such complex situations. Both the 
campaigns in Indian Kashmir and Nepal have shared such complexities and also have 
experienced failures and successes of varying degree at different times.  
In both cases during the 1990s, the insurgencies matured over time in terms of 
their capability and size. Their growth could be attributed to the lack of an effective 
population-centric strategy, legitimate political process, and economic development to 
address the population’s need and isolate insurgents from the local populace. The Indian 
and Nepalese governments predominantly handled insurgencies with the enemy-centric 
approach that contributed to an increase in clashes between the security forces and 
insurgents, human rights violations, collateral damage, and public suffering. As 
insurgencies in both countries continued, the rebels gained improved fighting experience, 
capability, and popular support from the rural population. This vulnerable segment of the 
population could be convinced to support the insurgents because the government failed to 
maintain a presence or provide basic administration in rural areas, and political leaders 
and government officials were often corrupt. As a result, people living in rural areas had 
lost confidence in a government that had not addressed their long-term economic 
deprivation, illiteracy, and unemployment. Furthermore, the militaries in Kashmir and 
Nepal in the 1990s, which should have protected the public, lacked an effective COIN 
strategy, doctrine and training, unified/integrated command, operations-friendly arms and 
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equipment, reliable and credible intelligence, and national-level information operations. 
Thus, this paper finds that the COIN approaches of both countries in the 1990s failed to 
counter the insurgencies and gain their peoples’ support effectively.  
Analysis of the Indian COIN campaign in Kashmir reveals that the mixed COIN 
approach implemented after 2001 has contributed to an increased level of success against 
the Kashmiri separatist insurgency in terms of gaining the people’s support and reducing 
the insurgent threats. By contrast, the militaristic approach of the Nepalese COIN 
campaign from 1996 to 2006 resulted in failure. In this most recent phase, the Indian 
government shifted its COIN strategy from a solely military approach to a mixed 
approach by integrating other available national means such as political, economic, and 
military. Their efforts have resulted in the increased level of success in Kashmir in 
several respects.  
First, the Indian government has resumed the political process to address the 
people’s grievances through the routine conduct of democratic elections at the local and 
state level. There has been progressively increasing voter turnout and participation of 
opposition political parties in all scheduled elections since 2002. Currently, the political 
institutions from local to state levels are in place and functioning with elected 
representatives. They can at least listen to the people’s legitimate grievances, a practice 
that was completely non-existent during the period from the mid-1980s to 2001. 
Diplomatically, the proxy war in Kashmir was changed when the Indian Prime Minister, 
Atal B. Vajpayee, and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, established a number of 
confidence-building measures to lower tensions over Kashmir in the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s. These measures had direct consequences on the Kashmiri insurgency. 
Furthermore, improved relations with the United States also worked to reduce tension 
during the Kargil conflict and the military crisis in 2001–2002. Similarly, U.S. pressure 
on the Pakistani government to ban the terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan in the early 
2000s also had a positive impact on the Kashmiri situation, although this could not be 
continued. 
Second, from the economic perspective, the arrival of tourists has resumed and 
dramatically increased due to improved domestic security. Reviving this industry has 
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contributed to increased revenue collection for the state. Also, there has been a gradual 
increase in economic growth because of the long-term and short-term investment in 
various employment projects and development programs from the central and state 
governments. The state legislatures now have the power to create jobs and prioritize and 
initiate long-term development programs and important construction projects, such as 
building roads, schools, and health centers. These developments have been significant in 
Kashmir since 2001, following the very slow pace in previous decades.  
Lastly, the Indian security operations based on the doctrinal pattern with a well-
trained force, modern arms and equipment, better coordination, and credible intelligence 
have now become relatively more effective in gaining local support and containing 
insurgent fighters in Kashmir. Meanwhile, massive military deployment along the LOC 
has also helped to prevent conventional war by deterring Pakistan and blocking the 
infiltration and exfiltration of terrorists. Due to these efforts, there have been distinct 
signs of improvement in the internal security situation in Kashmir from 2001 to the 
present. Among these improvements are steep and continuous decline in violent activities 
and insurgents’ capacity, in infiltration by terrorists from the LOC, in the displacement of 
certain religious groups, and in the overall casualty rate. Security operations have also 
provided a suitable environment in which to conduct local and state elections, expand the 
economic development programs from the central to the local levels, and increase the 
tourist flow. These efforts overall have shown positive indications in winning the 
people’s support and reducing insurgent threats as compared to the COIN efforts of the 
1990s. 
The countries launching COIN campaigns against complex insurgencies need to 
understand the limitations of the population-centric and the enemy-centric COIN 
approaches. Once an insurgency has matured, it will be very challenging to fully suppress 
it militarily or with other people-oriented programs or development approaches alone. 
For example, the Kashmiri separatist insurgency, in particular, has been continuing their 
armed struggle for more than three decades under the massive military response of the 
Indian army. The internal security situation seems now improved but the insurgency is 
still ongoing. Furthermore, it is very difficult to predict now what will happen after 
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NATO troops withdraw from Afghanistan. For example, after the former USSR 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the trend of insurgent violence in Kashmir 
increased tremendously with the flow of Mujahidin and jihadi terrorists into Kashmir 
from Afghanistan.  
To defeat such a complex separatist insurgency, however, the Indian COIN 
strategy in Kashmir must be able to reduce the insurgents’ capacity by deterring Pakistan 
from actively supporting Kashmiri separatist groups and blocking infiltration along the 
LOC, and through effective security operations by other forces within Kashmir. 
Meanwhile, continuing the legitimate political process and long-and short-term socio-
economic development programs are also equally important to address the people’s 
socio-politico-economic grievances. These programs will help to ensure popular support. 
Additionally, India should be flexible about negotiating with Pakistani as well as 
Kashmiri political representatives, by exercising maximum diplomatic strength with 
sincerity and seriousness. It is certain that the insurgency in Kashmir will continue unless 
and until Pakistan stops its support for separatist groups and withdraws its claims on 
Kashmir as a part of Pakistan. Therefore, this complex insurgency demands far more than 
strong military or population-focused efforts to achieve complete victory. 
In Nepal, despite the NA’s tactical success and limited people-oriented programs 
of the government during the later phase of the COIN efforts, the Nepalese enemy-centric 
COIN approach as a whole was not successful in decisively defeating the Maoists. Due to 
the government’s complete inability to mobilize other elements of national power along 
with the military to suppress the insurgents and gain popular support, the Maoist 
insurgents were able to effectively mobilize the rural population against the state. The 
excessive security operation made people lose faith in the state, which enabled the 
Maoists to gather popular support by creating an alternative society to address the local 
socio-economic grievances of the people. As Mackinlay observes, “The vital ground was 
the population, but the government and security forces opted for a military campaign that 
helped to drive the uncommitted communities into the arms of the insurgents.”363 Also, 
363 Mackinlay, “Nepal’s Transition,” 42–46. 
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the insurgents shifted their violent movement toward gathering political support from 
other opposition political parties, ethnic groups, and regional powers such as India. These 
efforts enabled the Maoists to find a common approach, a politico-military option to fight 
against the government by actively pursuing armed action against the security forces and 
keeping a political option open.  
The Indian government also played a vital role in mediation between the Maoists 
and other political parties. As a result, they became successful in organizing a nationwide 
mass movement against the government. Eventually, the existing government of Nepal 
was overthrown and replaced by the new coalition government of the Maoists and 
opposition parties. With the collapse of the government, its COIN campaign from 1996 to 
2006 ended in a failure to defeat the insurgency. This failure was due to the then 
Nepalese government’s overemphasizing only an enemy-centric approach. The 
government not only failed to defeat the Maoist insurgency, but it also failed to establish 
its own legitimacy and effectiveness in controlling the state’s institutions under the 
existing constitution. Later, the democratic constitution of 1990 was also replaced by the 
interim constitution. 
This research does not particularly focus on the reasons why Nepal is now passing 
through a critical juncture, where the process of constitution drafting and major political 
transition is in a deadlock even after the insurgency ended and the Maoists participated in 
the main-stream political process. Nor does this thesis examine why the Maoists have 
failed to become successful from the result of the second election of the constituent 
assembly in 2013, even after remaining at the center of power from 2008 to 2013. During 
this period, however, the Maoists were successful in bringing about major political 
changes in Nepal, such as transitioning from a Hindu kingdom to a secular republic, from 
a unitary system to a federal system, and from the election of the constituent assembly to 
drafting the new constitution. This discussion merely highlights a research gap for 
interested scholars to investigate.  
In summary, a state seeking to defeat insurgency tends either to adopt the 
population-centric approach that deals with the people’s grievances to gain their support 
and establish the government’s legitimacy and effectiveness by controlling the state’s 
 115 
institutions, or the enemy-centric approach to destroy insurgent fighters first in order to 
defeat the insurgency later. The first approach of addressing the people’s grievances 
through people-oriented political and socio-economic programs often becomes 
ineffective because these actions cannot be executed effectively in isolation when armed 
insurgents are active in the area. Without effective security arrangements, the state is 
unlikely to prevent insurgents from blocking the state’s political process and 
development programs and from blocking the people’s participation in these activities. 
The Nepalese case illustrates this. The second approach focuses on professional and 
effective military operations to control the insurgents first and ultimately to destroy them 
in order to defeat insurgency. This works when the insurgency is in the infant stage, or if 
the state has an effective and integrated COIN strategy. This strategy must also be 
executed by highly professional, well-trained and equipped forces under good 
coordination and credible intelligence. While this approach alone may defeat an 
insurgency, it is rarely effective in isolation. Thus, I argue that a combination of these 
two approaches, with consideration of regional and international factors, is essential for 
dealing with the insurgency and population at the same time.  
Finally, while the ideas, analyses, and arguments of this paper are possibly useful 
tools to inform the Indian COIN approach against the Kashmiri separatist insurgency and 
Nepalese COIN approach against the Maoist insurgency and to propose some effective 
steps, they cannot envisage decisive victory in the campaign. Any strategy or policy 
should be combined with the strong political will and commitment to execute it by 
proficient, well-trained, and disciplined teams in the field. The ultimate victory in the 
Indian COIN campaign in Kashmir will rest partly in the hands of the Indian political 
leaders and government’s agencies and in how they approach the overall Kashmir 
conflict in the future, formulate strategy and policy, and plan and implement them. 
Ultimately, though, victory needs to be measured in terms of popular support from the 
Kashmiri people for the Indian and Kashmiri authorities. Moreover, the role of Pakistan 
in the issue of Kashmir also needs to be considered. While the end of the Maoist 
insurgency in 2006 and the Maoists’ participation in the political process are now 
welcomed as a success, Nepal is still struggling to draft its constitution and consolidate 
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its government. Thus, ultimate success in Nepal will depend on the political leaders, 
including the Maoists, drafting the new constitution of the Federal Republic of Nepal 
with consensus, as it was one of the main demands of the Maoists who fought the violent 
insurgency for ten years.  
  
 117 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 118 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Acharya, Avidit. “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and the Political Economy of 
Violence.” Working Paper Series (2010). Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, Princeton University. Accessed November 25, 2013. 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228275655_The_Maoist_Insurgency_in_
Nepal_and_the_Political_Economy_of_Violence. 
Akhtar, Saheen. Uprising in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. Islamabad: Institute of 
Foreign Studies, 1991. 
Amir, Muhamed. Pakistan Security Report 2009. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace 
Studies, 2010.  
Anant, Arpita. “COIN and Op Sadbhavana in Jammu and Kashmir.” IDSA, Occasional 
Paper no. 19 (2011):1‒50. Accessed July 27, 2013. 
http://www.idsa.in/occasionalpapers/CounterinsurgencyandOpSadhbhavanainJam
muandKashmir. 
Asthana, N.C. and Nirmal Anjali. Terrorism, Insurgencies and COIN Operations.  
Jaipur, India: Pointer Publisher, 2001. 
Bakaaya, Priyanka and Sumeet Bhatti. “Kashmir Conflict: A Study of What Led to the 




Basu, S., and A. Riaz. Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal. Plymouth: Lexington 
Books, 2007. 
Bhattachan, Krishna B. “Nepal: from Absolute Monarchy to Democracy and Back-The 
Need for Inclusive Democracy.” The International Journal of Inclusive 
Democracy 1, no.4 (2005). Accessed November 26, 2013. 
http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/newsletter/vol1_no4_nepal.htm. 
Bloeria, Sudhir S. Pakistan’s Insurgency Versus India’s Security: Tackling Militancy in 
Kashmir. Delhi: Manas Publication, 2000. 
Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003. 
Boyini, Deepak Aneel. “Explaining Success and Failure Counterinsurgency in Malaya 
and India.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010.  
 119 
Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. 
Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2001. 
Callwell, C.E. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1986. 
Chalk, Peter. “Pakistan Role in Insurgency.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 (September 
2001). Accessed Aug 12, 2013. 
http://www.rand.org/commentary/2001/09/01/JIR.html. 
Chalmers, Rhoderick. “State Power and the Security Sector: Ideologies and Interests.”  In 
Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace. Edited by Sebastian 
von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012. 
Chowdhary, Rekha and V Nagendra Rao. “National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir 
from Hegemonic to Competitive Politics.” Economic and Political Weekly 39, no. 
14/15 (April 3–16, 2004): 1521‒27. Accessed December 2, 2013. 
https://www.academia.edu/807902/National_Conference_of_Jammu_and_Kashm
ir_From_Hegemonic_to_Competitive_Politics. 
Cox, Dan G. and Thomas Bruscino, eds. “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False 
Idol?” SAMS Monograph Series (2011): 1‒139. Accessed July 29, 2013. 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Population-
CentricCounterinsurgency.pdf. 
David, Sedan and Hussain Karim. “The Consequences of Conflict: Livelihoods and 
Development in Nepal.” Working Paper 185 (2002). Overseas Development 
Institute, London. Accessed December 5, 2013. 
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/2682.pdf.  
Einsiedel, Sebastian von, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan, eds. Nepal in 
Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012. 
Fearon, James D. Economic Development, Insurgency, and Civil War, Institutions and 
Economic Performance, edited by Elhanan Helpman. New York: Harvard 
University Press, 2007. 




Ganguly, Sumit.  “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and 
Institutional Decay.” International Security 21, no. 6 (Fall 1996). Accessed July 
18, 2013. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sumit.htm. 
———. Conflict Unending: India and Pakistan Tensions since 1947. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001. 
———. The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
Ganguly, Sumit, and S. Paul Kapur. India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear 
Stability in South Asia. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
Gentile, Gian. “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army.” The 
Official Home Page of the United States Army (December 29, 2009). Accessed 
July 29, 2013. http://www.army.mil/article/32362/a-strategy-of-tactics-
population-centric-coin-and-the-army/. 
Ghimire, Yubaraj. “The Many Dimensions of Nepali Insurgency.” In Building a CATR 
Research Agenda, Proceedings of the Third Annual International Symposium of 
the Center of Asian Terrorism Research (CATR). IDA Paper, P-4163(2006). 
Accessed December 16, 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a464068.pdf. 
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2012–13. Accessed 
September 6, 2013. http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR(E)1213.pdf. 
Gurung, Harka. “Social Exclusion and Maoist Insurgency.” National Dialogue 
Conference on ILO Convention 169 (2005). Accessed November 28, 2013. 
http://www.un.org.np/node/10313.  
Hill, John. “Royal Nepalese Army Adapts to Counterinsurgency Role.” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (July 2004). Accessed November 30, 2013. 
http://www.faqs.org/abstracts/author/janes-intelligence-review-2004/john-hill/. 
Indian Army. Doctrine on Sub-Conventional Operations. Simla: Headquarters, Army 
Training Command, 2006.  
Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC). Human Rights Yearbook 1999. Kathmandu: 
INSEC, 2000.  
———. Human Rights Year Book 2004, edited by K Gautam. Kathmandu: INSEC, 2004. 
———. Human Rights Year Book 2003, edited by Arjun Karki and David Sedon. Delhi: 
Adroit Publishers, 2003. 
  
 121 
International Crisis Group (ICG), “Kashmir: Confrontation and Miscalculation,” Asia 
Report no. 35 (2002). Accessed August 18, 2013.  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-
asia/kashmir/Kashmir%20Confrontation%20and%20Miscalculation.ashx. 
Jamal, Arif. Shadow War: Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir. New York: Melville House, 
2009. 
Kahl, Colin H. “COIN of the Realm: Is There a Failure of Counterinsurgency?” Foreign 
Affairs 86, no. 6 (November/December 2007). Accessed July 29, 2013. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63035/colin-h-kahl/coin-of-the-realm. 
Kapur, S. Paul. “Ten Years of Instability in Nuclear South Asia.” International Security 
33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 71‒94. 
Kem, Jack D. “Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade.” Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College, 2005. Accessed August 14, 2013. 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a550354.pdf. 
Khan, Feroz Hassan. Eating Grass, The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2012. 
Khan, Riaz Mohammed. Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance 
to Modernity. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011. 
Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.  
———. “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency.” The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency 
Conference, Washington, DC (September 2006): 1‒8. Accessed August 17, 2013. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf. 
Krepinevich, Anderw F. Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986. 
Kreuttner, Timothy R. “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and U.S. Counterinsurgency 
Doctrine.” Small Wars Journal (2009). Accessed November 28, 2013. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-maoist-insurgency-in-nepal-and-us-
counterinsurgency-doctrine. 
———. “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal 1996–2008: Implications for U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine.” Master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military 
Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Kansas, 2009. 




Kumar, Dhurba. “Proximate Causes of Conflict in Nepal.” Contributions to Nepalese 
Studies 32, no. 1 (2005): 51‒92. Accessed December 13, 2013. 
http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/contributions/pdf/CNAS_3
2_01_02.pdf. 
Lalwani, Sameer. “Indian Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem.” 
CTC SENTINEL 4, issue 10 (October 2011). Accessed August 2, 2013. 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/india%E2%80%99s-approach-to-
counterinsurgency-and-the-naxalite-problem. 
Latimer, William Scott. “What Can the United States Learn from India to Counter 
Terrorism?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. 
Lawoti, Mahendra and Anup K. Pahari, eds. The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution 
in the Twenty First Century. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 
2010. 
Letch, Steven R. “War in Shangri-La, The Information Dimension of Nepal’s Maoist 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2005.  
Long, Austin. Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency 
Research. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006.  
Mackinlay, John. “Nepal’s Transition to a Post-Insurgency Era.” The RUSI Journal 152, 
Issue 3 (2007). 41‒47. Accessed July 30, 2013. doi:10.1080/03071840701470384. 
Mackinlay, John, and Alison Al-Baddawy. “Rethinking Counterinsurgency.” RAND 
Counterinsurgency Study 15 (2008). Accessed August 28, 2013. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.5.
pdf. 
Maharjan, Panch N. Domestic Conflict and Governability in Nepal. Edited by Dhurba 
Kumar. Kathmandu: Center for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2000. 
Marks, Thomas A. “Insurgency in Nepal.” Strategic Studies Institute (2003). Accessed 
November 28, 2013. 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub49.pdf.  
Masoodi, Amin. “Kuka Parray’s Killing-A Setback to the Peace Process,” IPCS 
Terrorism Project J&K Articles #1162 (2003). Accessed August 19, 2013. 
http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism-in-jammu-kashmir/kuka-parrays-killing-a-
setback-to-the-peace-process-1162.html. 
Medhurst, Poul. Global Terrorism. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction, 2002. 
 123 
Mehta, Ashok K. and Mahendra Lawoti. “Military Dimensions of the People’s War: 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Nepal.” In The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: 
Revolution in the Twenty First Century. Edited by Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. 
Pahari. New York: Routledge, 2010.  
Mitts, Tamar. “Targeting and Spatial Spread of Insurgent Violence: A Study of Jammu 
and Kashmir.” Accessed August 29, 2013.  
http://tamarmitts.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/senior-honors-thesisnyu.pdf. 
Moore, Richard Scott. “The Basics of Counterinsurgency.” Small Wars Journal (2007). 
1‒24. Accessed August 2, 2013. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moorecoinpaper.pdf.   
Moyar, Mark. “The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin.” Small Wars 
Journal. Orbis Operations (June 29, 2011). 1–72. Accessed August 1, 2013. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-third-way-of-coin-defeating-the-taliban-in-
sangin. 
Nepal Army. Field Manual for Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School. 
Directorate General of Military Training, Army HQ: Army Publication, 2011. 
Pandey, Devendra Raj. “The Legacy of Nepal’s Development.” In Nepal in Transition: 
From People’s War to Fragile Peace. Edited by Sebastian von Einsiedel, David 
M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Patankar, V.G. “Insurgency, Proxy War, and Terrorism in Kashmir.” In India and 
Counterinsurgency, edited by Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler. New York: 
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2009. 
Poudyal, R.C. “Nepal Army and COIN against the Maoist Insurgency.” Master’s thesis, 
Tribhuvan University, Nepal, 2012. 
Poudyal, Santosh B. “Explaining the Success of the Nepal Communist Party Maoist 
(NCP-M): A Comparison of the Maoist Insurgencies in the 21st century.” 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 
Rajgopalan, Rajesh. “Innovations in Counterinsurgency: The Indian Army’s Rashtriya 
Rifles.” Contemporary South Asia 13, no.1 (March, 2004).  
Sahi, Prem. “Prachanda: The Mastermind behind the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal.” 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 






Samuel, Huntington P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of the New World 
Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997. 
Santhanam, K. and Sudhir Saxena. Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery. 
New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2003. 
Schofield, Victoria. Kashmir in Cross Fire. London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2003. 
Sharma, Mandira and Dinesh Prasain. Gender Dimensions of the People’s War: Some 
Reflections on the Experiences of Rural Women, edited by M. Hutt. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2004. 
Sharma, Rajni, Vinod Kumar Sharma, and Var Inder Singh Waris. “Impact of Peace and 
Disturbance in Tourism and Horticulture in Jammu and Kashmir.” International 
Journal of Scientific and Research Publications 2, Issue 6 (2012). Accessed 
September 3, 2013. http://www.ijsrp.org/research_paper_jun2012/ijsrp-June-
2012-96.pdf. 
Sharma,Yelisha. “Nepal and the Failed States Index.” Institute of Peace and Conflicts 
Studies Database Articles 30, Review #4059 (July 2013). Accessed September 2, 
2013. http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database/nepal-and-the-
failed-states-index-4059.html. 
Singh, Amrit Pal. “Countering Insurgency in South Asia: Three Approaches.” Small 
Wars Journal (September 23, 2011). Accessed March 3, 2014. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/countering-insurgency-in-south-asia-three-
approaches. 
Singh, Prakash. Kohima to Kashmir: On the Terrorist Trail. New Delhi: Rupa & 
Company, 2001. 
Snyder, Jack L. Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2000. 
South Asia Terrorist Portal Database. “Jammu and Kashmir Assessment ‒ Year 2012.” 
Accessed September 7, 2013. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india 
/states/jandk/assessment2012.htm. 





Springer, Nathan Ray. “Stabilizing the Debate between Population-centric and Enemy-
centric Counterinsurgency Success Demands a Balanced Approach.” Master’s 
thesis, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Kansas, 2011.  
Tellis, Ashley J., C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby. Limited Conflicts under the 
Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis. Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001. 
Thapa, Deepak. “Making of the Maoist Insurgency.” In Nepal in Transition: From 
People’s War to Fragile Peace, edited by Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. 
Malone, and Suman Pradhan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Thapa, Deepak, and Bandita Sijapati. A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist 
Insurgency, 1996 to 2003. Kathmandu: The Printhouse, 2003. 
Thapa, Manish. “Evolution of Maoism in Nepal: Understanding the Maoist Insurgency 
from Wider Perspective.” Accessed November 27, 2013. 
http://www.tigweb.org/youth-
media/panorama/article.html?ContentID=6491&start=5656. 
———. “Role of Civil Society and Political Party in Current Nation/State Building 
Process in Nepal.” Accessed August 21, 2013. http://www.fesnepal.org/reports 
/2008/seminar_reports/Paper_cets/paper_thapa.pdf. 
Thomas, Raju G.C. “India’s Security Environment, Towards the Year 2000.” Strategic 
Studies Institute (1996). Accessed August 30, 2013. 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=118. 
Tiwari, Chitra K. “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Internal Dimensions.” South Asia 
Analysis Group, Paper no. 187 (2001). Accessed December 5, 2013. 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper187. 
———. “Nepal: Maoist Insurgency.” South Asia Monitor, 31 (2001). South Asia 
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. 
Accessed November 28, 2013. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sam31.pdf. 
U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative. “Counterinsurgency Guide.” 
Accessed August 2, 2013. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf. 
Wagenen, Matthew J. Van. “An Analysis of the Indian Government’s COIN Campaign in 
Jammu and Kashmir.” Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, 2004. Accessed August 20, 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada428962. 
Western, John. Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the 
American Public. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 
126 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
127 
